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CRAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the intellectual content of Sophoclean drama, there 
is little that 1s more importa~t, and little that is more inter-
esting, than the treatment given to the fundamental norm of moral 
ity. The emphasis Sophocles places on this subject, the fact 
that he puts it in the foreground of some ot the plays, invites 
a serious study of it. Such a study of the measure of right and 
wrong in Sophocles would be one that inquires not only into the 
nature of that measure, but which examines as well the influen-
ces that led Sophocles to give the subject so much prominence in 
his drama; it would be a study which tests, too, the validity of 
his norm of mora11ty by a criterion of the true doctrine. Such 
is the threefold purpose of this thesis. 
It would be rather foolish, however, to begin discus-
sing Sophocles' doctrine on the norm of morality without first 
ascertaining whether there is such a doctrine in Sophocles' trag-
edies, and whether or not that doctrine is Sophocles'. After 
all, the man was not writing a philosophical treatise. He was 
a poet and a drL~atist, and what he wrote was poetical drama. 
It is indeed true that in Sophocles "the dramatic inter-
1 
--
2 
est always holds the tirst place."l And this is a tact to be 
kept in mind throughout the following treatment, lest through a 
minute study ot one aspect of Sophoclean drama a proper perspec-
tive ot the Whole be lost. But in spite of the prominence of the 
dramatic interest in Sophocles, it is by no means the only inter-
est. Sophocles t tragedies are not exclusively artistic studies 
devold of any moral significance. Sophocles studied human nature 
not only in its psychological aspect, he portrayed the "passions 
and sufferings of mankind • • • not only as they appear in tbe~ 
selves, but also as they appear in relation to the eterr~l laws 
ot just1ce and divine government."2 
To argue that Sophocles was not a philosopher but a 
dramatist, and that therefore the ideas, even the ethical ideas, 
expressed in his plays are not Sophooles. own, but merely those 
of the several characters in their particular situations, 1s to 
ignore an important truth about Greek poetry in general, and 
about Greek tragedy especially, the truth that the Greek poet 
was a teacher.) We have Arlstophanes t word4 tor this with re-
gard to the fifth-century poets, and we know that the poets 
bridge, 
1 A.E. Haigh. Ih! Tragic Drama g! !h! Greeks, Cam-
19)4. 168. 
2 Ibid., 169. 
-
) T.B.L. Webster, An Introduotion !2 SOEhoc1e~, Ox-
ford, 1936, 18. 
4 Fross, 1055. 
pi 
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themselves looked upon their profession in this light: 
Die griechischen Dichter haben sich immer ala die 
Lehrer und Erzieher ihres Volkes betrachtet. Den Pra-
gen, die aut aller Lippen schweben, m6gen sle nun die 
Politik des Tages oder die tietsten ProbleMe der Welt-
anschauung betreften, geht dar hellenische Dichter nicht 
aus dam Wage, sondern er sieht gerade dar1n seiner Be-
rut, 1m Kampt der Geister sein gewlchtlges Wort in die 
Wagschale zu werten.5 
Sophocles himself said that he did not present men as 
they are--Euripides did that--but as they ought to be.6 And in 
this approach to human nature, Sophocles was but a child of his 
age. With the beginning or the Sophistic movement, the problem. 
of human arete beca:me a focal point of discussion. The Athenian 
mind in the fifth century grew increasingly humanistic; not in 
an emotional philanthropic sense, but humwnistic in as much as 
intellectual interest gravitated toward a search into the true 
nature ot man. 7 Sophocles Vias caught up in the spirit of this 
humanistic movement, using the medium of his tragedies to express 
bis personal oonvictions on moral standards. 
Because Sophocles advanced his ideas on the norm af mo-
rality "p.icht ala Philosoph sondern .!!!. ]Cfinstler,"8 it is to be 
sical 
;; Wilhelm Nestle, "§o"phokles ~ .s!!. So;ghlstik," .£!!.!-
PhiloloSl, V, April, 1910, I~. 
6 Aristotle, !,getica" XXV, 1460 b 3~ .• 
7 Werner Jaeger, Paldeia: The Ideals ot Greek Culture, 
tr. from the 2nd German ed. by ~li'6ernfgnet;"o'il"ora, '!939, f,' 
275 & 277. 
8 Neatle, "Sophokles ~~ SORhistik," 152. 
... 
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expected that he employed as his method of teaching not the fron-
tal approach of the professional instructor, but the subtler ways 
of the poet. His effectiveness as a teacher would depend upon 
how well he centered attention on his tragedies as works' of art 
first and foremost; for only then would he have achieved'the 
proper emotional setting for his doctrine. It is this emotional 
setting that is so essential to the success of the teacher-poet. 
We must not expect, then, to find Sophocles preaching his doc-
trine on morality; for this would only vitiate his purpose. We 
must rather look for his teaching in the significant utterances 
of his characters and choruses interpreted in the spirit of the 
individual tragedies considered as a whole, as well as in the 
very subject matter ot the plays, espeoially of those dealing 
directly with a conflict of moral principles.9 The poet's doc-
trine, it is true, will not have the clarity of the teacher's, 
but it will be superior in power. 
A study of the norm of morality in Sophocles has a two-
fold value. One is philosophical, the other is literary. In the 
course of this thesis, it will be necessary to treat of certain 
"pure" doctrines ot the ancient Greeks on the norm of morality, 
i.e. principles on the nOMn which have been carried to their ex-
treme logical conclusions. as opposed to doctrines v/hich- illogi-
cally contain remnants derived from alien principles. These 
9 Webster,!2 Introduction, 18. 
--
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rtpure" doctrines throw a good deal or light on certain parallel 
doctrines in modern times--doctrinea, some or which are not 
"pure," others which are "pure" but advertised as original. Be ... 
sides this philosoph1c fruit, an understanding of the moral con-
tent ot Sophocles' plays will yield a fuller appreciation of the 
tragedies as works of art. Much of the power of the dramatic 
situations and characters in Sophocles is dUG to the philosophi-
cal framework upon which the situations and characters are con-
structed. The clearer the idea one has of the intellectual 
framework, the deeper will be his appreciation of the emotional 
superstructure which comprises the heart of the tragedies. 
The procedure followed in the subsequent chapters is a 
simple one. In the presentation of his doctrine on the norm of 
morality, Sophocles was reacting, to a large extant, to the doc-
trine of the Greek Sophists. A comprehensive understanding and 
full appreciation of Sophocles' doctrine depends, therefore, on 
a previous knowledge of at least the basic tenets of the Sophists 
who influenced him. The relation of Sophocles' moral doctrine to 
that of the Sophists is presented in an article on the subject by 
Wilhelm Nestle, "Sophokles ~ lli Sophistik." The thesis bor-
rows freely from this article for the moral doctrine both of the 
Sophists and of Sophocles himself, but supplements the pertinent 
matter of the article with research in the primary and other 
secondary sources, and rearranges it so th.at the logical sequence 
of the ideas becomes morEl apparent. Complete originality ot 
6 
treatment can be claimed only in the evaluation of Sophocles by 
the criterion of the orthodox doctrine on the norm of morality. 
This evaluation is trw final step toward an appreciat10n of Soph-
ocles' teaching on the norm. Thus, the thesis falls neatly into 
four divisions: (1) the doctrine of the Sophists; (2) the Soph-
oclean reaction and negative doctrine; (3) Sophocles. positive 
doctrine; and (4) the evaluation of the positive doctrine. 
--
CHAPTER II 
SOPHISTIC MORALITY 
strong ideas are often reactionary. Dam up the stream 
of a Demosthenes' agresslve thought with a stubborn pacifism, and 
that stream w111 grow into a raging torrent, will search out the 
weak points in its obstacle, exploit them in a hundred unpredict-
able ways, and finally break througb in one grand endeavor. Op-
pose an Aristotle on a fundamental issue, and you will set otf 
cerebral fireworks of such brilliance and variety as to be com-
pletely oYerwhelming. There are strong ideas in Sophocles on the 
subject of moralIty, and their strength and abundance loads us to 
suspect that they are reactionary. Tho evidence confirms such a 
suspicion, Not only are Sophocles t ideas on moralIty reaotionary 
they are ideas whose strength and tmportanee are not fully appre-
ciated until their reactionary nature is reoognized and under-
stood. 
To whom or to what did Sophocles react? ~Vhat was the 
goad that provoked htm to such strong and beautiful expressions 
on law and morality as are found, for example, in the Oedipus 
Tyrannus or the Antigone? We may answer simply, but in words 
that require a good deal ot explanation: Sophistic morality. It 
1 
ps 
8 
is in the moral doctrine of the Sophists that Sophocles finds, in 
a negative sort of way, inspiration to present his own firm con-
victions concerning the bases of good and evil through the medium 
of his plays. 
While the present and following chapters will be con-
cerned with pointing out the opposition between Sophoclean and 
Sophistic ideas where thoy meet on the field of right and ~TonG, 
it must be kept in mind, tor an adequate and acou!"ate understand-
ing of the matter, that Sophocles was not opposed to the Sophis-
tic spirit in its entil. ... ety. On the contr(u~YI there is one 3.0-
pect of that spirit into which Sophocles himself entered whole-
heartedly, as is evidenced quite forcibly by what is probably 
Sophocles' best known choral ode, the one in the Antigone wh+ch 
celebrates in magnificent and enthusiast1c language the aoco~ 
plishm.ents of man. l The Sophists, espec1ally Protagoras, glori-
fied man as the conqueror of nature, praised him unstintlngly tor 
his advancement in material and intellectual eiv1lization.2 
Sophocles gives poetical embodiment to this humanistic spirit of 
the Sophists in the Antisone. ~Vhere has humanism found more 
powerful expression than in the first line of the famous ode:1lo'A::' 
"Wonders are many 
1 Anti~one • .33~ .... 375. 
2 Nestle, "Sophokles ~ .lli Sophist,1.k, If 136. 
.... 
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and none is ~nore wonderful than man, n3 with its emphntic repeti-
tion of the strong O&LV&V and the rhythmic concentration on the 
, , 
word avep~~OU?' Man conquers the stormy nea, makes the anclent 
Earth yield him crops. Man oaptures bird and wild beast, tames 
the horse and the powerful bull, 'and forces them to serve him. 
:Jan has developed the art of speech, has learned swift thought, 
has organized societles, has devised r.leans to protect himself 
from wind and cold and rain. Man is ~4V~O~&po', nall-resourcefu~ 
But Sop~ocles does not go all the way with the Sophists. His 
principles allow him to travel down the road of thought only a 
short dis~ance with them, eine kleine Strecke Weges,)a the part 
of the road that passes through the country of empirical accom-
plishment. After that he parts company with them. Sophocles 
turns right. He gives his whole eulogy on the resourcefulness 
of man an ironic turn by concluding it with the grim wAlCU ~&vov 
q>e(Y~,v o&x ''Jtd.,e~4', "only against Death shall he call for aid 
in vain." He reflects further that the ingenuity of man can be 
used just as easily for evil purposes as it can for good. The 
Sophists, on the other hand, turn left. Their Woltanschauuns 
takes them down the road of the "enlightenment. ff Perhaps it vie 
follow along with them for a bit, we may find out just what it 
3 Ant1sone, 334. All English translations of Sopho-
cles are taken from B.C. Jebb, Sophocles, 1B! Plays ~ Fras-
ments, Cambridge. 
. . 
3a Nestle, "So;ehokles ~ lli. S.oEhistik," 135. 
r 
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is about their views on morality that caused the conservative 
Sophocles to react against them. 
Dr. Nestle makes the strong statement that the thought-
content of Sophocles 1 poetry derives its proper character from 
its fundamental and forceful opposition to the Sophistic Enlight-
enment.4 The statement implies that there was a common element 
in the doctrine of the Sophists against which Sophocles could re ... 
act. Nestle 1s not 'the only one to group all the Sophists under 
one heading, as vlill easily be seen front the t.ables of contents 
in a number of histories of Philosophy. But the point is not an 
easy one to make. The Sophists do not form a philosophic school 
in the sense that the Neoplutonists or the AI'ist·')telians do. 
They are not branches of the srune trunk. They are independent 
stalks. Hence it cannot be said ~ Eriori as it may be said or 
other groups that there is a common denominator in their respec-
tive doctrines, which characterizes them as a school. Such simi-
lar1ty of doctrine can be established, if at all, only.! poster-
iori. 'llheodor Oomperz' investigations on the subject led him to 
-
the conclusion that the Sophists shared little more in common 
than their name: 
'iJ11at was the genuine common factor in the several Soph-
ists? And to that question we can but reply that it 
connisted 111erely of their teachine profossion and the 
conditions of its practice tmposed by the age in which 
"they lived. For the rest, they were united .... by 
11 
the part they took in the intellectual movements of 
their times. It is illegitimate, it not absurd, to 
speak ot a sophistic mind, so~istic morality, sophis-
tic scepticism, and so torth./ 
Nevertheless, there are authorities who do not hesitate 
to take this "illegitimate" view of Sophistic doctrine, and the 
evidence they otfer in support of their views would seem to indi-
cate that Oomperz has sacrificed complete accuracy to strength ot 
expression, Alfred Benn concludes his treatment ot the individua 
Sophists with the tollowing observation (supported by his previoul 
exposition): 
Taking the whole class together, they represent a com-
bination of." three distinct tendencies, the endeavol" to 
supply an encyclopaedic training tor youth, the cultiva-
tion or political rhetoric !is a special a.rt, and the 
search atter Q scientific foundation for ethics derived 
i'rom the results of previous philosophy. ~:lith regard 
to the last point, th~y agree in drawing a fundamental 
distinction between Hature and Law, b"!.'~t ao1':1O take one 
and some tru~e the other for their guide • • .6 
This view, especially the assertion that there was a common te~ 
deney present in the ethical doctrineot the Sophists, is corrob-
orated by Heinrich Rammen7 and E:dward Zeller.8 Zeller stresses 
5 Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, tr. Laurie Magnus, 
London, 1939, I, 415. 
102. 
6 Alfred Beon, !!l!. Greek :r:hilosophers, London, 1882, I 
7 Heinrich Hammen, The Natural Law, tr. Thomas R. Han-
ley, O.S.D., St. Louis, 1947, ~ ---
8 Edward Zeller, Greek PhllOS0ph~, tr. Sarah Frances 
Alleyne and Evelyn Abbot, New York, !S95, ~ • 
12 
the underminlng of all law as the common effect ot Sophistic doc-
trine, and this is the point in which we are particularly inter-
ested. It is the legal aspect (legal in its widest sense) ot the 
fifth-century Autkllrgns which especially disturbfld the harmoni-
ous soul ot Sophocles. Thus, what the Sophist~ had to say about 
law takes on a special interest tor the student or Sophocles. 
The war that raged in fifth-century Uellns between Rbz-
!!! and nomos makes just as interesting reading in its own way as 
does the Peloponnesian War. And it is a tar more important war 
than the Peloponnesian, especially it one takes into account its 
counterpart in modernphllosophy. Rousseau is Hippias translated 
into French, and Hobbes but repeats Protagoras, though both ot 
the moderns pride themselves on the originality of their doc-
trine. 
The history of the war between nature and law begins 
with Heraclitus (c. 536-470 B.C.). 9 Though an extrelnist with re-
gard to the general outlines of his philosophy, when it came to 
the question of law, Heraclitus was the Scholastic of the fifth 
centur'1 B.C. He was to the anoient Enlightenment what Suarez 
was to the modern, in that his orthodox views on law preceded 
historically a catael1sm ot error. Whereas Suarez, however, 
reached. h1s conclus1ons a.bout law by be1ng logical, Heraclitus 
reached his by throwine logio overboard. Heraclitus' farll0US 
9 Hommen, The Natural Law, 5-6. ~ J ______ 
13 
principle, 'It(lv't'G. per, 060lv ~~ve" should have precluded once and 
for all anything stable, anyth1ng permanent in his philosophy. 
But such was not the caae. '«hat Heraclitus buried with one sen-
tence, he resurrected with another. The eternal flow, since it 
was a flow of all things, should have swept along with it law. 
But Heraclitus perceived a pattern and a kind of stability in the 
flux, and.for this stability he needed a principle. So he did 
the obvious but illogical thing. He postulated an eternal and 
divine 1050S to rule the tlow ot things and to establish order in 
it. This law was the norm, not only ot physical ehange,"but al-
so ot hwnan :at .. dl1 conduct. To this fundamental law all other 
laws were subordinate. They all depended on it tor their validi-
ty: 
a~~oyerY &pe't'n ~el(o.'t'~' oo.{~ 4A~eia. A~le,v xa.t ~o,erY xG.'t'! !do.~ ~G.tov't'a.': •• (UV~V O't'& 'lt~O' 't'A 
,pOVaelY ••• ~ v v6i AJYOV~4' tOXqp'~1gea.l xpn ~, ~uv~ ~dv't'wY, &xw~£p v~~~ ~&AI', xa.i XOAU toxupo't'lp-
~'t 't'Ql,OYj41 ~a~ 'ltdv't'c' 21 lveQW!elo, V&~Ol ~ 
.vo, 't'06 geTou.V-__ .;;..0;;;. ....... 
Soundnesa ot mind is the greatest virtue; and wisdom 
consists in speaking the truth, and in hearkeninE to 
rulture and actl;na in accord with it •. -; •• Understand-
ing Is common to alT •••• TEOie who speak with un-
der$tanding must be strong through what is common to 
all, as a oity through its law, and stronger still: 
for all h~~ laws draw their torce from a sinale law, 
WIi'rcllIs .,;;;d ... l .... v ..,In ...e.... --
Thus, as Hommen says, Heraclitus saw in, and not beyond, the di-
versity ot human laws the one, immutable, natural law, trom which 
9 Hermann Diels, D1.e Fra~ente dar Vorsokra.tiker, Ber-
lin, 1934, 22 B, tr. 112-114:--Ita.r~snot-rn the orIgInal. 
--
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the human laws draw their torce.10 Beatitude, tor Heraclitus, 
consisted in submitting to the divine order ot things, to the 
eternal 1aw.ll 
'Jbat Heraclitus had so neatly and correctly joined to-
cather, the Sophists put asunder. PhIsis and nomo~, which Herac-
litus had blended into one pattern, became now for the Sophists 
two separate standards, serving as the symbols of two opposed 
concepts concerning the norm ot ~oralit7. Under the one standard, 
physls, 1s grouped the ~tate-ot-Nature faction, headed by the 
Sophist Hippias, and supported strongly by Antiphon, Ca11ic1es, 
and Critias. Marshalled under the standard of nomos are the Rel-
ativlsts: Protagoras and his followers. 
It was not without reason that the state-of-Nature 
Sophists evolved the doctrine they did. They were seeking a so-
lution to a se~ious problem. Most of them were foreigners, and 
the laws of the Greek polis discriminated against foreigners. 
Hence, the same laws that the citizens considered to be right 
without qualification (even Socrates held this view) the Sophists 
stigmatized as not only accidentally but essentially unjust. 
When Heraclitus distinguished between nature and positive law, he 
was planting positive law firmly in the ground of natural law, 
thus giving positive law a source of vigorous life. But when 
10 !!:!!. Natural f!'!.!. 6. 
11 Zeller, Greek Philosophl. 70. 
.., 
Hippias and Antiphon and Callicles distinguished between Rhzsi~ 
and nomos, it was rather to uproot positlve law from the so11 of 
nature, and thus to kill it. It wa.s not that the laws needed re-
form in their eyes. It was a case of their being substantially 
bad. Only what was right or wrong by nature was validly right or 
wrong. Anything else was merely the machination of an interested 
party.12 
Hippias, probably the first of the Sophistsl3 to advance 
a State-or-Nature theory, was a Leonardo ds. V1nci and Henri Berg-
son combined. He wns a universal genlus~ a Jack of all trados: 
astronomer; geometrician; arithmetiCian; theorist in phonetics, 
rhythm, music, sculpture, painting, chronology, mnemonics; myth-
ologist; ethnologist; ambassador; writer of epic, tragic, epi-
grammatic and dithyrambic poetrr; master of industrial a.rts: and 
not least of all philosopher.14 Such a plethora ot abilities 
goes a long way towards explaining Hippingt philosophic views. 
Hlppias was irked with the lav/s of the Greek ~ol1.9, distinguish-
12 Hommen,!h! Natural~, 7-8. 
13 It is helpful to make a distinction here between 
the spirit of the early Sophists, contemporaries of Socrates, and 
the later ones, pupils of Socrates and contemporaries of lllato, 
together with the Eristics, whom Aristotle opposed. Though Plato 
10 his Dialo~es attributed to the early Sophists the tradition-
al "sophistic" manner, it is quite certain that the7 were not the 
quibblers and extreme sceptics that the later Sophists Viere, b'.1t 
rather were sincere and serious thinkers. ct. Gomperz; Greek 
Th1nker~, 420 ... 421, for a discussion of thispolnt. -
14 Gomperz, Oreel' Thinkers, 431. 
--
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ins and discr1minating as they d1d between Hellene and barbarian, 
c1tizen and metic, free man and slave. He champIoned the idea 
that all men are equal by nature. And when Hipplas said equal, ru 
d1d not mean merely essentially equal. He had the Rousseauean 
concept that if men could get back to a state of nature everyone 
would be happy, because everyone would exist with that se1t-sut-
fictency with which nature must have endowed all men, but which 
was being mmotbered and stifled by laws and conventions, That is 
why Hippias himself developed his talents along so many lines. HE 
was out to achieve the self-sufficiency he thought htmself and 
everyone else capahle of by nature, and he would do it, civil 
laws notwithstanding.. He even went so far as to appear at the 
Olympic games once in garments fashioned entirely by his own hand 
from the sandals on his feet to the rings on his f1ngers. 1S 
There are three aspects of Hippias t doe trine on phIsis 
and nomos that are pertinent to the subject matter of this thesis 
The first is the fact that he made a distinct10n between nature 
and positlve law. We shall, in the next chapter, see Sophocles 
doing something of the sort. The second point is that he held 
the natural law alone to be bind1ng and sa1utary.16 F1na1ly, Hip-
p1as was quite vague as to the content of his natural 18.\"1.17 
15 Oornperz, Greek Thinkers, i~31. 
16 Alfred Benn, 1.h!. Ore,e}! ?hi1osorllers, London, 1914, 
17 The same may be said of the other Sophists who es-
17 
., 
outside of the tact that it was universal and necessary, and made 
all men equal, it seemed to have little further determination. 
When lIlppias pushed positive law from tho pedestal ot 
natu~e which served as its foundation, his SUll was to establish 
equality among men. But another' Sophist_ who stood by and wit-
nessed the bold act, saw that it could well serve another end, 
which happened to be more tO'his particular liking. When Anti-
phon, then, divoroed positive law from its tundwr.ont in nature, 
he did so because positive law stood in the way of pleasure: 
~4 XOAAA ~&v xu~a v&~ov o'XAI~v xOAe~I~' ~ft ,doel xef-~u,· vo~oel~~u, tAp 'xl ~e ~or' 6.eaA~of'. a OeT ad. ~O~, ap&v xu, « OU Oef- xul ,~, ~or, ~tvl 4 ocr 4d~a 
4xodclV xut I od Otr· xal '~i In yA~~. d ocr ad~~v 
AlYllY xal « cd olr ••• xG& ~r if v,. ~v Otf 4d~&v 'x&eU~lrV XAI ~v ~~. od ~!v 0 v ouoev ~n ,dOtl "Al~­~epG Odo' olx" &~tP4, 4.' ~v ot v&~o, 41t~plllouo, 'tou' 4vep~ou', ~ 4,' 4 xp~p'1loua&v.18 
Most of the things wh1ch are just according to law are 
hostile to nature. There are laws tor the eyes, what 
they may see and what they may not; and for the ears, 
what they may hear and what they ma,. not; and tor the 
tongue, what it may speak and what it may not • _ • and 
tor the min~f what it may desire and what it may not. 
lIow tb.e proh1bltions ot the law are in no way more ta-
vorable or akin to nature than its injunctions. 
The hedonistic flavor ot this passage is unmistakable. 
Whereas H1ppias was vague as to what he meant by nature as a norm 
ot morality, Antiphon would seem to have identified nature with 
the animal nature ot man, or at least with human nature in so 
£!, 228. 
poused the State-ot-Nature theory. cr. Green, Mol-
- -
3, 25~ 
18 Dials, Fratpent., 87 B 44. fr. A, Col. 2, 26 .. Col. 
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far as it ii the subject of the pleasure of the moment. Indeed. 
Antiphon condemns such "scrupulous" behavior as wa.iting until one 
is injured to inflict harm, treating harsh pa.rents kind17, fail-
ing to meet legal char"ges with counter-charges, all on the ground 
that 
Iv ~&( e~pol ~oAi~'A ~n .doe&· lv, ~' Iv Q6~of' dAydv-
toeA' ~AAOV, tt&v ~~~, xel 'Ad~~w ~OeOea'A etAv 
XA&lw, xal XAxm, ~doxelv ,~&v ~n ~doxe'v.l~ 
one would find them hostile to nature: there is more 
pain in them where less is possible. less pleasure where 
more is possible, and suffering where its absence is 
possible. 
For a man whose only criterion of right and wrong is pleasu~A and 
pain, na.ture carries its own punishment of wrong in the pain it 
inflicts, and the onl7 wrong connected with the violation of a 
positive law is in getting caught. Antiphon says that the thing 
to do i. to uphold the laws when witnesses are present; but When 
there are no w1tnesses to follow the precepts of nature. The 
precepts of the law are arb1trary; those of nature, necessary. 
The dictates or the law result from convention, the mandates of 
nature from natural growth. Consequently, one who transgresses 
the laws incurs no disgrace or punishment provided that he goes 
undetected by those who made the laws. But 1t caught, be must 
pay the penalty of the law. The transgressor ot the innate prin-
ciples of nature, on the other hand, meets with no less evil it 
undetected, and with no more it caught. For he is injured, not 
...... 
19 Ibid., Col. Ih 31 - Col. 5, 24. 
19 
by the opinIon of men, but by fact. 20 
The little pebble that Hlpplas had sent hopping down 
the mountainside had seemed innocent enough. Hippias was merely 
looking for equality. But by the time that pebble had rolled 
half way down, it had dislodged many more pebbles; and, atter the 
movement had passed Autiphon, it was beginning to look dangerous. 
It was reserved to Cr1tias and Call1c188, rlowever, to turn the 
state-ot-Nature theory into a thundering landslide. These two 
men saw very clearly the truth to wh1ch H1pplas' eyes we!'e 
closed: that there would be less equality among men in a state ot 
nature than thEu-a existed in conventional society. Men simply 
did not possess the same endowments. Some were wiser than others. 
some cleverer, some stronger. But while Crltlas and Callicles 
rejeoted one of Hippias' errors, they embraced one ot Antiphonts: 
onlY' the palntulis wrong, only the pleasurable good. And the 
mixture of the two gave them a new doctrine to proclaim, a Will-
ot-the-Stronger theory, an Uebermenschenmoral. 21 C&11iolel and 
Cr1tias are a preface to Nietzsche and Cax-lyle. In the animal 
kingdom, the stronger overoomes the weaker. The same holds true 
among warring states. In nature, m1ght makes right, the rule of 
the strongex- prevails. What, then, were these laws of men that 
tettered the stronger and held him in subjection? They were in 
20 ~., Col. 1, 12 - Col. 2, 23. 
21 Nestle, ttSoEhokles ~ .2!!. SOEhlstik," 154. 
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reality a conspiracy of the weak to ~aster the strong. Laws such 
as were being enforced in Athenian dem.ocracy were unjuet 1n the 
nost fundamental sense of the word. It was for the stronger tew, 
then, to seize the reins ot government trom the weak. They had 
a right to authority by a title both older and more valid than 
the unnatural laws then in rorce.22 
We are struck again and again by the remarka.ble paral-
lels existing between thought of the Greaks, eapeciallr of the 
Sophists, and that of Descartes and his philosophical progeny. 
It is a repetition that torms a telling argument against the He-
gelian theory that the thought of the Absolute is gradually 
evolving itself throu.gh a process of thesis and antithesis. And 
what is true about philosophical theories themselves 1s true also 
about the manner of their growth. The pattern ot growth is the 
same today as it was in five-hundred B.C. Hellas. Someone pro-
poses an erroneous doctrine, someone else develops it, perhaps a 
third party carries it to its logical conclusion. Then there ap-
pears a philosopher with enough common sense to see the falsity 
of the extreme conclusion; he reacts to it, and begins to search 
for prem1ses that will obv1ate it. 
Such, tor example, was the case with the moderns, 
Locke, Berkeley, and IIume, and their doctrine on cognition, 
22 Rommen,!h! llatural 1!.!, 11; Benn, .!h! Greek Ph1,lo-
sophora, 84~ 
21 
Locke laid down principles in the light of which he should have 
denied the existence of substance, but did not. Berkeley saw the 
illogicality ot Locke and denied the existence of corporeal sub-
stances, but inconsistently admitted the existence of spirits. 
flume promptly rectified Berkeley's error. and thus destroyed the 
possibility of any scientific knowledge, Then Immanuel Kant ap-
peared on the scene, wishing very much to save scientific know~ 
ledge; so he reacted to flume, and laid down a set of premises by 
which he thought to rectIfy the false conclusion--in vain, how-
ever, for he did not back down the wrong road far enough. And 
when he finally turned off in a new direction, he still had be-
hind him some of the errors that Locke had made in the first 
place. 
The Sophists tollow much the same pattern as these mod-
erns. The Locke of the Sophists was Hippias (the analogy here 
is not between the ancient and modern doctrines, but only be-
tween the series of action and reaction by which those doctrines 
were developed). He laid down the false premises by dividing 
law from nature. Then came Antiphon, amplifying, developing 
, 
along new lines. And finally, there appeared Callicles and Cri-
tias to play the Humean role of carrying the false premises to 
their extreme conclusion. The stage was now set tor the en-
trance of the reactionary; and he came in the person of Protagor. 
as. 
Many of the moderns who are most vociferous in their 
22 
denunciations of nature as the fundament of morality, are so be-
cause they identify natural law with the law of a state of nature 
such as Hobbes or Rousseau conceived it. IIence their condemna-
tions are well-founded, since the natural law of Hobbes and Rous-
seau i& ill-conceived. It 1s only because the condemners view 
natural law inadequately that they are mistaken. Similarly with 
Protagoras. He denounced the theory that morality had its foun-
dation in nature only because he identified tha.t theory with the 
doctrine voiced abroad by the Sophists mentloned above. It was 
absurd. he sald, to take the beasts as models of conduct for men. 
Human beings could not be left to their 1nstincts and be expected 
to achieve superior development. They needed the advantages of 
" 
civilization, especially of the social virtues. of justice and 
reverence. It was mere folly to prefer the so-called simplicity 
ot savages to the complexities ot oivilised soclety.23 Plato 
represents him as tlrus anSWering the naturalists of his day! 
I would have you consider that he who appears to you to 
be the worst ot those who have been brought up in the hu-
manities would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had ~o 
educatIon, or courts ot justice, or laws, or any re·" 
strainta upon them which compelled them to practice vir-
tue-with the savages, for example, whom the poet Phere-
crates exhIbited on the stage at the last year's Lenaeon 
festival. If you were living among men such as the man-
haters in his chorus, you would be only too glad to meet 
with hurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully 
23 Benn,!h! Greek PhIlosophers, 89. 
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long to~reviBit the rascality of this part ot the world.24 
Protagoras' reaction to Callicles, Antiphon, and Hlpplas 
though correct in so far a8 it condemned a talse theory ot moral-
ity, was unfortunate in this, that it had nothing better to sub~ 
stitute. In r~ct, there are not wanting arguments to show that 
the state of the question was a little more favorable to truth 
before Protagorae' contribution than after. The chief difficulty 
with Protagoras was that he was a sensist, and thus could arrive 
at no absolute principle as the basis ot morality. His fundamen-
tal thesis that cognit1on 1s sense percept1on25 could not but in-
fect his views on morality. Protagoras sought to bolster the 
validity of positive law by pointing out its Moessity tor civi-
lized man, but he was destined to tail because the only prop he 
could utilize was the very weak one of convention. Before, there 
was necessity at least and universality in the foundations of 
morality, however inadequately those foundations might have been 
constructed; and there was the possibility of seeing, in time, 
the true oonnection between universal nature and positive law. 
But now there existed only the particular and contingent, and it 
was impossible, working from such premise., to construet'anything 
but a relativistie theory of law and morality. \f.hatever was the 
London, 
, -
Plato, protasoras, 327, tr. B. Jowett, 3rd ad., 
148-149. 
Gomperz, 01"6&11:: Th1nkers, 4.56 • 
. 
24 
original meaning of Protagoras' much disputed "man is the measure 
of all things," this much, at least, can be said ot it. The 
statement represents admirably, according to what may be,term.ed 
\, 
an obvious 'interpretation, its author's views on moralIty. Wher-
ever mere human convention is the supreme rule ot right and 
wrong, moralIty is whatever man makes it. 
It 1s important to note also, tor its pertinence to our 
treatment ot Sophocles, that Protagoras· principle or cognition 
led him to a scepticism in theological mat~ers, forcing him, of 
course, to divorce morality completely f~om ~lything savoring ot 
the divine or the atter-lire: 
~cpl ~ey et~v 06x Ixw cCoival, oGe# ~~ ctaly oGe' ~, 
o6x eCalv oGe' A~orol ~Iye~ toiay· ~O~A4 ,4P ~4 XWAU-
o~a tl~al ~ ~' 'O~A~~~ x«l ~p«x~~ wv 0 ~lo~ ~o~&v­
Sp'!h:ou. ~ith regard to the gods I am unable to know either that 
they exist or that they do not, or what form they might 
have .• tor many things stand in the way ot such knowledge: 
especially the obscurity of the matter and the shortness 
ot man's l1fe. 
It there was anyone thing that grated more than ~ll else on 
Sophocles! moral sensibilitles, it was this exclusion ot the di-
vine from the realm. of ethics. 
Someone has said that originality in philosophy is no 
longer possible. Take any stand on a question you can conceive 
ot I and you will find that SOl1leone before you has sOl"iously spon ... 
sored the same view. Thus it is with the problo:m of :nature a.nd 
26 Diels, Fragmente. 80 B 4. 
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law. The Greek Sophists seem to have left little room for an 
original position in the matter. Either positive law is founded 
on nature or it is not. If it is not, either law or nature alone 
must be the sole basis of morality. Heraclitus embraced the firs 
position. He said that positive law was rooted in nature. That 
nature alone determined right and wrong was the thesis, with 
slight variations as to details, of Hippias, Antiphon, Callicles, 
and Critias. Finally, it romained for Protaeoras to assert that 
law alone, arbitrary law, founded not on nature but on convention 
was the sole measure of right and wrong. These are the theories 
that form a background to Sophocles' teaching on the norm. It 
remains to be seen which of these positions the doctrine of Soph-
ocles most closely resembles. 
CHAPTER III 
OPPOSITION TO TIm "ENLIGHTEN~mNTft 
Before considering the positive aspect of Sophoclean 
tnorality, it will be well to treat of his moral teaching in so 
far as it is an attack agnln&t the views advanced by the Sophists 
Such an approach to Sophocles' positive idees will serve to place 
them in their proper perspective. 
Of the seven existing plays of Sophocles, five contain 
matter of a sufficiently obvious moral nature to merit considera-
tion in this thesis: Antisone, Ajax, Oedipu~ Tytannus, Philocte-
.l!!, and Oedi,eus Coloneus. Sophocles opposes in these plays bot 
the positive-law concept of Protagoras and the state-of-Nature 
theory of Hippias, Antiphon, C&.11icle8, and Critias. 
With regard to the State-ot-Nature theory, Sophocles' 
attack is threefold. Agaiust Hippias he upholds the existence 
and binding character of law, especially "eternal" law. He as-
sails the sceptiCism and hedonism of Antiphon. And, f1nally, he 
heaps abundant condemnat10n on the Will-of-the-Stronger theory of 
Callicles and Critias. 
Hippias had been struck forcibly by the differences and 
apparent contradictions present a:nong existlne laws (V&~Ol). 
26 
jiiiiP 
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'" ~I.'hese differences led him to the conclusion, first, that vOt..&.0' 
had only an arbitrary and relative character, and that therefore 
vo~o, had no binding force; but, secondly, that nature alone (,d. 
0") was salutary and commanded respect in the moral order. Soph. 
ocles attacked this concept of vo~o' vigorously in the Ant1sone, 
especially when the )lot..&.o~ in question was divine (sottsewollt).l 
Wilhelm Nestle calls the Antigone a declaration of war against 
Sophistic doctrine.2 Creon is the nenlightened" despot who would 
overthrow by sheer force the hallowed usages enjoined by reli-
gious law. Nestle continues: 
Del' Angelpunkt des Dramas ist auoh del' Angelpunkt 
del' Polemik. Ratte die SOlhistlk einen Gegensatz von 
:Naturund 81 tte festgestei t und dem konventlonellen 
Braucn, zu dam sie auch die Religion rechnete, das un-
gesohrlebene Recht del' Natur entgegengesetzt, so voll~ 
zleht Sophokles in schlrfsten Wlderspruch hiegegen die 
rneinsetz~ von Natur und Sitte und insbesondere von 
DatuI' undelrgton.3 - . 
Whether Sophocles went so far as to assign nature as 
the fundament of law and morality is debatable, but there is lit-
tle doubt of this: that Antigone is the champion of an effica-
cious and absolute divine law in the face of a tyrant who tried 
to subordinate that law to human caprice. When Ismene excused 
herself from the divinely imposed duty of burying her brother, on 
1 Nestle, "Sophpkles ~ ~ Sophist1k," 137. 
136. 
2 tt [!]~ Kr1esserkllrl.l!lS gegen ili Sophistik." !E!.!!., 
3 Ibid. Italics in the original. 
-
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the score that she was forced to it by circumstances, Antigone 
retorted: 
• • • • • • • • S • • • J • • • • •         ty~ ol O~ ~d.ov
X~oouo' d.oe~~ 'lA~d~~ xope~oo""4&. 
But if thou wilt, be guilty of dishon-
oring laws-which the gods have stab-
lished 1n honor. • • • I, then, will go 
to heap the ~arth above the brother 
whom I love.4 
Antigone answers lsmene's charge that she is over-zealous to per-
fOrr:1 this duty with a succinct <lA.A.' oto' 4peoxouo' 01, .... (b.loe' 
clOeTv ~e Xp.q. "I know that I please whore 1 am most bound to 
please. n5 And when the final test came, and Antigone had to face 
a Creon angrily charging that she violated his edict, she did not 
flinch in her loyalty to divine law: 
Cr. 
An. 
Cr. 
An. 
4 Antisone, 76-81. 
5 .!E.!a.-, 89. 
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among men by the Justice who dwells with 
the gods below; nor deemed I that thy de-
crees were of such force, that a mortal 
could overr1de the unwritten and unfail-
ing statutes of heaven. For their lite 1s 
not of to-day or yesterday, but from all 
time, and po man knows when they were first 
put torth.t> 
Antigone is condemned to death for her convict1on, and fearful of 
death though she be, she never loses sight of the faet that she 
dies in a noble adherence to the div1ne v&~o~: 
A£dooe~e, e~~~~ or xo~pav{Oa" 
~nv ~Ga'A£104v ~odv~v AO'~~V, 
014 ~p&' ofwv 4vopwv ~noxw, 
~nv e~o£~{av ae~(oeaa. 
Behold me, princes of Thebes, 
the last daughter of the house 
of your kings,--see what I suf· 
fer, and from whom, beoause I 
feared to cast away the fear of 
heaven 17 
The selt-centered and self-exalting Enlightenment of 
Hippias, soorning law and falsely gloritying human nature, this 
Enlightenment, in opposition to which the character of Antigone 
is drawn, is no less foroibly damned by Sophocles in what Nestle 
ealls the Herzpunkt of the OediEus :rzrannu,s, B the beautiful chor-
al ode in pro'ise ot reverence for the ete%tnal 1aws.9 In the api-
6 
7 
8 
o 
,/ 
.!E!!!., 447-457. 
Ibid., 940-94.3. 
-
tlSoJ2holdes ~ ltl:.!. SO;Ehlstik, n 148. 
Oed'pus TI£annu~, 863-910. 
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.., 
sode which precedes the ode, Oedipus has treated Creon with 
"overbearing harshness!,lO He has accused Creon of plotting to 
gain control of the throne of Thebes, and of inducing Teiresias 
to utter his terrible prophesies. Jocasta has been no less over-
bearing in her scorn of the prophetic powers of Apollo's ~inis­
ters. While Oedipus and Jocasta are thus giving expression to 
their ego in true Hlppian style, with little regard to a law 
which is higher than their eao and to which their ego mu~t con-
torm,there runs parallel to this false exaltation of nature the 
rising suspicion that Oedipus is guilty of his father's blood, if 
ot nothing else. The choral ode following the episode develops 
in wonderful contrast these two central themes of the tragedy. 
The first stanza deals directly with reverence for the heavenly 
laws: 
It ~Ol tuvel~ ~lpov~, 
~Orp4 ~av 16o,~~ov QyvIlav ~oy~y 
IplwV ~t ~dv~wv. ~v v&~o, ~poxe'v~al 
~'luoOe~, odpavlav 
o,lutelp'u ~Ixvwelv~e', ~v ·OAU~~O~ 
xa~~ ~~vo', odol VlV 
eva~a .UOlO &vlQwv 
I~lx~ev, o6ol ~~ ~o~e ~4ea xa~axo,~don· 
~i,aaei~i~~Ul~1!le!iAd &gotihB~~tte 
praise of reverent purity in all words 
and deeds sanctioned by those laws ot 
range sublime, called into life through-
out the higb clear heaven, whose father 
1s Ol-ympus alone; their parent was no 
10 Richard C. Jebb, SOEhocles, The Plazs and Frasrrents, 
I, !h! Oedipus Tzrannus, CambrIdge,' i902,-rr6, n. onllines 6j-
910. 
race of mortal men, no, nor shall obliv-
ion ever lay them to sleep; the god is 
mighty in them, and he grows not old. ll 
31 
Then, abruptly, in the second and third stanzas, the chorus de-
nounces the deeds of "enlightened" and proud nature: 
~~p,' 'U1£uel ~Up4VVOV· a~p,',. ~OAAmV ~~lp~A~oefi ~4~4V, 
a ~n ~'X4'P4 ~~O'ou~.ipov~uJ 'Xp&~4~4 ytTo' 4V4~aO' 
4no~~~d~4V Wpouoev et, tVdYX4V, 
Ive' od ~oot xp~ot~~ 
Xp~4' •••• 
;c·ol ~,' 3~jp~~~a·~;por~ ~ i&y,·~~PtU£~4l, 
A(X4' "o~~o' odOi 04'~OV~V lo~ al~~v, 
xaX4 V&V lAo,~o ~OTP4, 
Ouon~~ov xdp,v XAl04', 
It ~~ ~A xipoo' xepOaveT Olxatw' 
xal ~Gv 'ol~~~v Ipxe~4', 
~ ~&v 'elx~wv elt&~4l ~4~4,~V. 
~l' I~l ~o~' tv ~oToO' 'v~p eeGv ~iA~ eG~e~41 tux" '~uve,v: 
et y~p 4& ~o,aIOe ~p4tt., ~1~'4', 
I t OfT ~I xooet~e'YJ nso enee ~reeas ~ne tyrant; Insolence, 
once vainly surfeited on wealth that is not 
meet nor good for it, when it hath scaled 
the topmost ramparts, is hurled to a dire 
doom, wherein no service of the feet can 
serve •••• But 1f any man walks haughti-
ly in deed or word, w1th no fear of Justice, 
no reverenoe for the images of the gods, 
mayan ev11 doom seize him for his ill-
starred pride, if be will not win his van~ 
tage fairly, nor keep h1m from unholy deeds, 
but must lay profaining hands on sanct1t1es. 
Where such things are, what mortal shall 
boast any More that he can ward the arrows 
of the gods from his lite? Nay, if such 
deeds are in honour, wheretore should we 
32 
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join in the sacred dance?l2 
Jebb sees in tho word "Cupavvov of the second stanza quoted, a 
reference to the overbearing manner of Oedipus. The A&y~of the 
third stanza he interprets as applying to Jocastats intellectual 
arrogance .,13 Oedipus manifests his pride in the ha.ughty attitude 
~e takes toward Creon in the second episode, persistently charg-
ing the latter with suborning Teiresia" the seer, to accuse Oed-
ipus of unholy deeds. Jocastats arrogance appears especially in 
the lines: ~~' o6xl ~«v~e(~' y' Iv au"" ~nO' 'y~ ~Ai.«,~' Iv 
o~vcx' oG~c ~nO' Iv ~~tpov. "So henceforth, for what touches 
divination, I would not look to my right band or my left.,,14 
When Hippias tore the limbs of law from the trunk of 
nature and said in effect that the limbs should be burned and the 
trunk should remain, he did little by way of making the trunk ap-
peal to ments sight. He merely left it stand in its ugliness. 
The task of beautification was left to Antiphon, 0&11ic1es, and 
Critias. The two schools took the same general approach to their 
work: they concentrated ments vision on one pleasant aspect of 
the trunk of nature to the exclusion of its less desirable fea-
tures. Antiphon chose the sweet sap tlowing from the open 
wounds. He held the pleasure of the moment before men's eyes, 
12 Ibid., 873-896. 
-
910. 
13 Jebb, ~ qedipus Tyrannus, 116, n. on lines 863~ 
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and told them to make this the measure of their actions. Calli-
cles and Critias singled out the sturdiness of the wood. They 
made the will of the stroneer the criterion of morality. 
The hedonistic current of Antiphon's phllosophy, so tar 
as this has come down to us, results from the juncture of two 
complementary streams of thought. The first is the self-suffi-
cient and sceptical rationalism of the Sophists. As in the mod-
ern, so in the ancient Enlightenment, only that is considered to 
be true, if anything at all is so considered, which the human un-
derstanding (more otten the human senses) can grasp clearly. It 
is humiliating to have to admit the truth of something the mind 
or the senses cannot see, and the "enlightened" were not to be 
humiliated. The "enlightened" were supreme--"man is the measure 
of all things,,15--and whatever failed to fall within the bounds 
of immediate human cognition was to be vigorously opposed. The 
divine belonged to this class of objects, and whatever was con-
nected with the divine--divine law, after-life, inspired prophe-
sy, religious cult, etc. Thus was Antiphon, a true son of the 
Enlightenment, forced to seek on the human level for a norm of 
morality, tor a rule by which man should measure his 11fe's con-
duot. And what on the human level is a more obvious norm of ac-
tion than the simple one of pleasure and pain? This is the seo-
15 1l4V'tWV XPTllJ.4'tWV tJ.~'tpov 'o'tlv tiv9pw'J[o<;. Diels, 
Frasmen~e, 80 B (Protagoras), Frag. 1. 
ond stream of thought, which, joined with the ratlonallstlc, con-
stitutes the hedon1sm of Antiphon. It begins with the strong at-
traction toward pleasure that 1s 1n every man, and the equally 
strong aversion to pain, A man chooses to follow the easy way of 
lite, sets up pleasure and pain as his positive and negative norm 
of conduct, and then proceeds to rationalize away anything that 
would tend to interfere with h1s philosophy: God, divine law, at-
ter-life, insp1red prophesy, re11gion, etc. 
Jocasta, in the OediPBs !lrannus, 1s the personifica-
tion of this latter stream of thought. She is happy VIl. th Oedipus 
at Thebes, and she will allow nothing, be it heaven itself, to 
inter.fere with this happiness. Hence, when the prophesies ot 
Teiresias betoken an interference with this earthly pleasure, she 
follows the Sophistic line of thought in defending the status 
g,uo. She denies the power ot prophesy. She insinuates that in 
the divine itself there is no reality. To Oedipus' 
she answers: 
~4 0' o~v ~apov~a ouAAa~~v eean(a~~a 
xer~a, ~ap' -A,On nOAU~O~ !(I' o~Oev&~ 
But the oracles as they stand, at least, 
Polybus hath swept with him to h1s rest 
1n Hades: they are worth nought, 
oGxouv 'r~ aot ~4G~a ~poGA'rov ~dAa,: 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ~~ vuv I~' 46~mv ~~ev i~ eu~&v ~dAn~. 
Nay, d1d I not so foretell to thee long 
since? • • • Now no more lay aught of 
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those things to heart.16 
She concludes with a summary of her hedonistic philosophy: 
~l 0' av ,o~or~' ayap~o'. ~ ~a ~~, ~uxn' 
xp'a~cr, ~p&vola 0' la~,v ouOevA' aa.~'; 
ctxft xp~~,o~ov ~~v, S~W, Ouva,~o ~,'. 
ad 0' It, ~d ~n~p.&' ~~ .0~oG vu~.cd~u~a· 
~OAAOr yap ~on x~v &vctpaolv ppo~~v 
~n~p.l ~uveuv4oenoaV. ~AA4 ~aGa' s~¥ I~~: ~};~fvst~iAg~~f~1~?~a~!0~0~8it~m 
the decrees of Fortune are supreme. and 
who hath olear foresight of nothing? 
tTis best to live at random. as one may_ 
But tear not thou touching wedlock with 
thy mother. Many men ere now have so 
fared in dreams also: but he to Whom 
these things1 i re as nought bears his life most eas1ly. "{ 
~~'hat a modern ring have the lines: ,exn xpd~, ~ov 'fiv, t\X6.}' od-
vcu~& ~", and etAAd. 't4Ge' &t'tl nap' o~Oev fa~., pq.~a ~&v ~lov 
qlepe&t 
Antiphon calls prophesy "the guess of a resouroeful 
manr18 and Nestle remarks that this statement "!!1 senau ~ ~­
!!! B!! rationalistisehen Aufkllrun6 far ~ Mantik."19 
Sophocles severely oondemns the rationalistic hedonism 
of Antiphon as embodied in the character of Jocasta. TIe does so 
by the tragic fulfillment of the very prophesies that Jocasta 
16 Oedipus Tzrannus, 971-975. 
17 ~., 977-983. 
19 
'p~netl', ~l ,~, ~av'tlx~, ,r~£v· -&vep~ou .pov{~ou 
Dials; Frasrn!nte, 87 A 9. 
"Sophokles ~.!!!.! Sophlst1lt~, n 151. 
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scorns, and by a striking presentation of the insecurity of pres-
ent happiness, as evidenced by the suicide of Jocasta and the re-
duction of Oedipus from the position of a self-oonfident king to 
e. state of utter grief and self-imposed exile. The lesson Soph-
ocles would have us take away with us from the tragedy is olari-
fled in the olosing verses of the chorus; 
, ~dlPa~ 8~~n~ ~volX~'AeA'UOOf~" olo(~ou, ~Oe. 
a, ~ xAe(v 4'v'y~~ pue, xal xpd~,~o' ~v 4vnp, o~ ~l~ 06 tnA~ ~OA,~QV ~ar~ ~uxa,' 'vi~Ae~ev. 
It, Soov xAdooova OI'V~' au~,op4' 'A~AUe£V. 
~O~£ ev~~&v ave' lxelvnv lnv ~eAeu~alav (oerv 
~'P4V 8~I~O~oGv~q ~n6lv! &~~{~e,y, ~plv !v ~~p~a ~oa ~lou ~ep4on ~noCV 4lyelvov xae~v. 
Dwellers in our nat1ve Thebes, behold, this is 
Oedipus, who knew the famed r1ddle, and was a man 
most mighty; on whose fortunes what citizen did 
not gaze with envy? Behold into what a stormy sea 
of dread trouble he hath come t Therefore, while 
our eyes wait to see the dest1ned final day, we 
must call no one happy who is ot mortal race, un- ~ 
til he hath crossed 11te 1 s border, free from pain. cO 
If Descartes, standing as be did at the font of modern 
philosophy, could have beheld his intellectual progeny up to the 
present day, doubtless he would have been dumbfounded. Starting 
from a false epistemological prinoiple, Descartes distinguished 
too radically between soul and body, and his distinction begot 
two schools of thought which have carried his premises to their 
logioal conclusion: the one, idealism; the other, materialism. 
Had Descartes foreseen these developments of his principles, it 
may reasonably be conjectured that he would have employed a great 
20 Oedipus TIrannuB, 1524-1530. 
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deal more caution in enunciating then. 
Perhaps Hipplas, too, would have proceeded more care-
fully with his revolutionary distinction between law and nature, 
had he foreseen the full results ot that distinction in the Soph~ 
iats who took it up. 
When Hippias appealed against law to nature, he seemed 
to presupposa, like his modern counterpart, Rousseau, that all 
men are equally endowed by nature. CaIlio1es and Critias, how-
ever, were quite aware of the falsehood of this presumption, and 
proceeded to rectify the oversight. Some men are physically 
stronger, some intellectually keener, than others; hence, an ap-
peal to nature as the rule of lite meant logically that the norm 
ot morality should be the will of the stronger, be be the intel-
lectually or the physically stronger. 
As repugnant as this view of morality is to the aver-
age man, it naturally has a great appeal to the strong--most es-
pecially to those who hold the power of government. That the 
theory did not fail to gain adherents is shown by the fact that 
Plato gives it a prominent position in the first book of the !!-
public, introducing the vociferous Thrasymachu8 as its proponent: 
,~~l yAp eyw ,Tval ~& O(xalOY oox iAAO ~l ~ 10 ~oG 
xpe(~ovo~ tu~~ipov •••• ~oG~' o6v 'a~tv, & P.iA~,a~£, 
o Aiy~, 'v 4~aa«,' ~4f' ROA£oav ~«6~oy £ val O(xalov, 
~O ~~~ xae&O~~xuta' 'PX~~ tu~.lpov. 
I proclaim that justice 1s nothing else than the inter-
est of the stronger. • • • And that is what I mean when 
I say that in all states there is the same principle of 
r=--------. 
justice, which i& the interest of the gove.rtlr.lOnt.21 
Indeed, so wIdespread an acceptance d1d the doctrine meet wIth, 
that the Athenian embassy to the government of Mel08 1n the Pel-
oponnealan War seemed to take ita truth tor granted; seemed, 
moreover, to take It tor granted that all men in all ages recog-
nized ltD valIdIty. In opening ,the debate, the Athenians adopted 
the doctrine as the ve~ pr1nc1ple of discussIon: 
[o~X] ~~I' &~&oG~ev ~ ~~l A~xeO~l~OY{WV !KOlXOI ov~e' 
06 ~UVt~p~~£~o~~e ~ W, ~~4' o~olv ~6lx~a~~t A'YOV~«' 
16...0 ' • • ,t. 't: I' , f'f. Ol'vvQ.l nelOtlV, ~a Ouv~~a 0 c~ wv ~XQ.~tpo, ~Anew' 
~povoG~tv O,a~paoaeoeal, 'nla~a~fvou' npA' eCO&~a' 
~'t' OlX(lla \Lev lv ~, &'v9pw'Jt£{ftl }"OY<P &'JtO 'til)' rOT)' 6.vdy-
XT)' xplvt~a" Ouva~4 Oe or npouxoy't" npdOOOUOI xal or 
409evef' ~uVXwpOG01V. (x] or must you expect to convince ua by arguing that, 
although a oolony of the Lacedaemonla.na, you have taken 
no part to theIr expedItIon., or tr~t you have never 
done us any wrong. But you and WG should sal what we 
really think, and a1m only at what 1s possible, tor we 
both a11ke kn<>w that into the discussion of human af-
ta1re the question of justice only enter. where the 
pressure ot neoes.ity i. equal, and that the powerful 22 
exaot what they can, and the weak grant wt~t they muat. 
As the discus.ion with the Melians proceeded, the Athenians clar-
1f1ed th1s principle, appealIng, as did Callicles and Critlaa, to 
nature tor its defense: 
nro~~te4 yAe ~O ~e ettov OO~~ ~A 4VgeW~t'&v ~& 04'~' 
O,! n4v~o' u.o ,~oew' &vayxa,a~, 03 av xp4~fl, apxeLv· 
xal n~er, 06~t eev~e' 't&v v&~Oy oG~& x£,~iv~ ~Q~O' 
xp~ad~evo" av~a Oe n4paAa~ov'tt' xat 'o&~evov ~'aCet 
21 Plato, ReRu'bllc, I, 1)8, C and E. Tr. B. Jowett, 
!h!. Dialoi!!e .. f! g! !..l,\to, lew York, 1937" 
22 Thucydide., V, 89. Tr. E. Jowott, 1~~cld1~~$" Dos-
ton, 188,). 
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xa~aAe(.ov~e~ ,p~~&ea a6~.t &to~c~ xal u~a~ Iv xal 
aAAOU~ 4v ~n au~n Ouvd~e, ~~rv y&vo~.vou~ OpQv~a' Iv 
~a.6"C&. 
For of the Gods we believe, and of men we knot';, that by 
a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. 
lh1s law was not made by us, and we are not the first 
who have acted upon it; we d1d but Lnberit it, and shall 
bequeath it to all time, and we know that you and all 
m~lnd, 1t you were as strong as we are, would do as we 
do. 
It was not, then, same philosopherts dead abstraction 
that stung Sophocles' moral sensibilities, The Will-or-the-
stronger theory was then, as it is today, a living reality, that 
moved armies to slaughter the innocent, and moved governments to 
enslave the weak--and this, under the guise of Justice. It was 
to check the inroads of such a theory that Sophocles focused most 
acutely his poetical powers: 
Still more, Sophocles stands opposed to those 
warped conceptions of human conduct that find their ul-
t1mate sanctions • • • in the momentary advantage at 
the stronger or more shrewd (a common deduction from 
w si!) ,cq. , 
It is especially to deflate this Will-of.the-Stronger 
theory that the Ajax "p1chtet polemische 2Eitzen sagen ~ ~-
2t: kllrung." ~ The purpose of the drama is to expose the nothing-
ness of human strength when viewed in relation to the might of 
J:!! Greek 
23 Ibid., 105. 
-
24 William Chase Greene, Moira, Fate, ~, ~ ~ 
Thousht, Cambridge, Mas s ., i911-8, "14'D." 
25 Nestle, "SoEhokles ~ ~ SOEhistlk," 143. 
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the godS. 26 ~Ajax, drunk with his own physical strength, is 
seized with a J~pl' that does not hesitate to scorn even the 
gods. When, BS he left home, his father a.dvised him, -r'XYOV, 
O&pl ~OdAOU xpa-refv ~'v, aUY ee~ 0' 4el xpa'tefv, "My son, seek 
victory in arms, but seek it ever .. vith the help of heaven, U he 
answered arrogantly: 
~4'tep, eeor~ ~~v xav ~ ~~oa" ~y ~~oG 
1. • "" " xpa'to~ xa'tax't~oal't • ey~ 6e xaa O,~a 
1I.&I;toov 1te'ltOl ea... 'to~'tl' 41[1 01t40e l v t xlio'. f ~a~~~er, wltu the ,~e p or gods e en a man 0 
nought might win the mastery; but I, even 
without their aid~ trust to bring that glory 
within my grasp,21 
True to his word, when Athena stood at his side in battle and of-
fered him her encouragement, he rebufted her, saying: 
Ivaaaa, 'tor, allola," 'Apyelwy 1tela' 
~~~~,xg~~~f~oS'b~gf~'tt:P~~~r~~~ekSJ 
where Ajaxastands, battle will never break 
our line,2 
The tone of the whole play justifies us in interpreting the mes-
sengerts comment on these lines as Sophocles' own view) 
26 
'tolofoOe 'tOL l&YOlOLV 4o'tepy~ 6ea, 
'-x~oa't' 6py~v o~ X4't' !V6pw1toy ,povwv. Dy such words !t was that he brought upon 
him the appalling anger ot the goddel!, since 
his thoughts were too great tor man.~ 
Ibid. 
-
21 Ajax, 164-169. 
28 Ibid., 114-115. 
-
29 Ibid •• 
-
716-711. 
~------------~ 
Sophocles tells us that because Ajax did not think as man should, 
because he prided himself on his physical strength and thought in 
a true Sophistic spirit that nothlr~ counted but strength, be-
cause he lived his life on the principle that physical power gave 
him a title to whatever he desired, ... -ror this, he was destined 
to ruin: 
;~£AA£~, ~4Aa', l~eAAe~ Xpov~ 
~epeo,p'wv !p' '(uvdooe,v XUX4V 
~orpuv l~elpeo{wv xovwv. 
Thou wast fated, hapless one, thou 
wast fated, then, with that unbend-
ing soul, at last to work,,8ut an 
evil doom ot woesunt.Qld t 
It is not only the obvious injustice ot adopting phys-
ical strength as an ultimate criterion of action, but its utter 
foolishness, that Sophocles wishes to impress on his audienoe. 
Why, he would ask the Sophists, choose for your rule ot 11fe a 
norm which is so unstable, one so apt to turn on you and bring 
results just the opposite of those desired? Athena speaking to 
Odysseus is Sophocles speaking to the world against Call1cles t 
brand of Sophistic morftlity. Alluding to the mad Ajax, she says: 
~o,aG~a ~olvuv etooplv uuipxo~ov 
A ! 'Il# .f" 'It ~~v~V ~o~ e'~n' 4V~9' e,' etOu' ~~O', ~~o' 6yxov apU'~~odv I et ~'vo, xAeov ~ Xe'Rl ~pleel' ~ ~axpoa XAO~~OU ~4ee,. 
w' ~~~pa XA/v!l ~e xavByei U4A1V 
4~av~a ~aVep~R£\u· ~o~~ ol aw,povu' 
eeol .,AOGOI xu, ~uyoGa, ~o~~ xaxo~'. 
Therefore, beholding such things, look 
30 Ibid., 928-930. 
-
., that thine own lipa never speak a 
haugnty word against the gods, and aa-
sume no swelling port, if thou preval1eat 
above another In prowess or by store of 
ample wealth. For a day can humble all 
human thing., and a day can lift them up; 
but the wl.e of heart are loved pf the 
god., and the evil are abhorred.,Jl 
OdJaaeys in the Ajax and OdJsseus in the Philoctetes 
are two difterent charactera. 'In the AJax he is all kindness, 
aoderation, piety; he i8 a foil to the headstrong Ajax and the 
yengeful Menelaus. In the Ph1100tetea he ls the opportunism In-
carnate of the Sophistic Will-of~the-Stronger spIrit: "Die 
.elbatalohtige Ueber..enachenmoral • .. . wir4 in del' Per.OD de. 
OdJs.eua, del' bier ein ganz anderer i.t als deraelbe Held in 
"Ajas" dargeatellt und beklmpft."la In the AJax, OdJaseua i. 
pre.ented as 
one who has taken deepl1 to heart the leason of modera-
tion, and of reverenoe tor the goda, taught by Athena'a 
punishment ot hi. rival; and, if there i8 no great ele. 
vation in his oharacter, at least he perfor.m8 a credita-
ble part in di8suading the Atreldae from refusing bur-
lal to the dead.33 
In the Philootetes he 18 an exponent of the Sophistic principle 
that the end justifl •• the means, and of the diotum enunciated by 
Plato's Thrasymaohual eTv~, ~O Olxa'ov oux IAAo ~, ~ ~O ~oG 
31 Ibld., 127-133. 
-
32 lestle, "Sophokle. ~ ~ Soph1stik," lS4. 
3J R.C. Jebb, Sophocle., The Plals !2! FraiM.nts, IV, 
~ Philootete., Cambridge, 1890, xXx-:-
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.., 
w.pe('t'tOVO<; ~\)"",ipov.34 When the sincere Neoptolemus asks him, 
p6x «toXp&v ~yer O~« 't& te\)O~ Aiye,vi"Thou thinkest it no shame, 
then, to speak falsehoods?" Odysseus gives him as answer that has 
become a byword for present-day sophists tl1.e world over: oux, e t 
~O awe~vc{ ye ~O 't60o~ ,ipe,. "No, it the falsehood brings de-
11verance."35 
When the Sophists divorced nature from law, they did 
away with ultimate ends and focused on the here and now. So, 
too, Odysseus of the ~~~lo~tetes. He could be virtuous indeed, 
but not for virtuets sake. Virtue was for him a means to an 1m-
mediate end: his own gain. Virtue for Odysseus, when he prac-
ticed it at all, was only a part of his over-all opportunism: 
03 yAp 'to&oG'twv O&f, 'to,oG~o' et",,' 'Y~· 
x~ou oaxclwv x4yce~v 4vopwv xplo,', 
odx Iv A4~O" ",,&'11 ~·«AAOV o~O~v' e~oe~~. 
vlxiv ye ~'V'tOl ~«v'tcxo6 xpn,wv 1,\)'11 ••• 
Such as the time needs, sucn am I. 
Where the question is ot just men and 
good, thou wilt find no man more scru-
pulous. Victory, how~ver, 1s my aim 
in every field • • ,J 
Sophocles draws the unprinCipled character of Odysseus 
against the background of an upright and straight-thinking Neop-
tolemus. It is Nestle's opinion that Neoptolemu8 was meant to 
34 Quoted above from Plato, Re~ub11c, I, 338, c. 
35 Philoctetes. 108.109. 
36 Ibid., 1049-1052. 
-
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be a model for young Sophists to follow. Just us Neoptolemus, so 
tOO the young Sophists had been drawn i'rom the path of conven-
tional morality. And it was Sophocles' hope that tho Sophists, 
as did Neoptolemus, would return to a healthy ethics after but a 
short detour. 37 
In no other play does' Sophocles use tho word 00.&' and 
Its derivatives so much as in the Philoctetes.38 And the flavor 
of the word 1n this play is unmistakable. It represents that 
perverted sort ot wisdom which resulted trOD! the Sophists t ex-
elusion of law from life as a nor,m of action. 
word Odysseus uses for the plan whe,reby he would capture Philoc-
tetes. 39 Again, in explaining the plot to Neoptolemus, Odysseus 
says: 
~A~' ~6~o ~06~o OcT ao~,ae~va" XAOX&U' 
~xw, yev~aa, ~~v 'v'x~~wv ox~v. 
No; the thing that must be plotted is 
just this,--ho. thou mayePB win the re-
sistless arms by stealth.~ 
The ao<plCl that was the Sophistic ideal was a. f·wisdom" which rode 
roughshod over any sense o:f shame. Odysseus motivates Ueoptole-
mus towards his part in tho plot by pointing out to tho young son 
~ , . 
of Achilles that he will be considered 00.0' xClyct90', "wlse and 
37 Nestle, "Sophokles ~ .2!!. Sophlstlk," 154-155. 
38 
39 
40 
Ibid., 155. 
-
Phl10otetes, ~. 
Ibid., 77-78. 
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valiant." But Neopto1emus wall knows what such wisdom implies, 
for ~e yields to Odysseus with tha words: r~~· ~o,~a~, .4aav ~LO­
XJv~v ~~et~, "Come what may, I'll do it, and cast off all shame." 1 
A man can be 4vd~lO~, "of little worth," but at the same time 
Yhwaan aoq>o~, "clever of tongue.,,42 He can be aOq)o~ 'v x4xoT~, 
"cunning in ev11.,,43 And when Neoptolemus finally rejects the 
spurious wisdom to whloh Odysseus had encouraged him, he does so 
because it is opposed to justice: 
OA. 
NE. 
Od. 
Ne. 
" Ii r Ii • f au 0 ou~e ~~ve ~ OU~E Opaa&le,~ oo,a. 
4AA' ,t OlX4La, ~&vao~v XPEto~ ~40e. 
Thy speech is not wlse, nor yet thy purpose. 
But if just, that Is better than w18e.44 
Creon of the ,oediEBs Col~neus is perhaps Sophocles' 
clearest proponent of the Uebe~n8chenmoral, where that philoso-
phy rests on physical strength and hypocrisy as its basis. Cre-
onts purposes in the play are patently at odds with justice. 
Bence he throws justice overboard in pursuing his aims, and re-
lies instead upon duplicity and sheer force. Acting on the prin-
Ciple that everything is right which nature, divorced from law, 
can accomplish, Creonts first attempt is to lure Oedipus back to 
Thebes by a hypocritical adroitness of speech. But Oedipus sees 
41 IbId. , 
-
119-120. 
h2 Ibid. , 
-
439-440. 
43 Ibid. , u t b 101$, 
44- Ibid. , 
-
l245-1246, 
p 
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tbrough the sham and brings it into the open: 
~& o&v 0' 4.rX~a, O&Gp' d~&pA~OV o~o~, 
.OAA~V Ixov ~&~lV ••• 
But thou hast come hither with fraud on thy 
lips, yea, ~1th a tongue keener than the edge 
of a sword.4-5 
When duplicity rails him, Creon falls back on the baser means of 
physical force to gain his cnd. -Ho has seized lamena. He now 
seizes Antigone and attempts to lay violent hands upon Oedipus 
himself. It is only the timely intervention or Theseus that pre-
vents him--Theseus, whose nobility of character and selfless ad-
herence to justice contrast sharply with the Sophistic machina-
tions ot Creon; Theseus, "der nicht mit Worten sondern mit Ta.ten 
~......... ......... .... 
dem Leben Glanz verlelhen, del'll Recht dienen und das Unrecht ver-
......... ........... ................................. 
elteln 'IIill."46 
. . 
A philosophy can be deceptive in the abstract and in 
its more general principles. Sophism was and 1s so deceptive. 
Sophooles exposes the deceit by concretizing the abstract in the 
Oedipus Coloneus, and by presenting general principles in their 
particular deduotions. Creon is the concretion of the Call1olean 
brand of Sophism, the Will-of-the-Stronger morality. Theseus is 
the embodiment ot the conservative morality. Sophocles p~esents 
the two in stark oontrast, and asks the beholder to choose be-
tween them. 
45 ~edi~us Coloneus, 793-794. 
46 Nestle, "Sophokles und die Sophlstik. '* 156. 
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Although the State-of-Nature theorists and Prot agoras 
a:-rived at the same conclusion, in that they both divorced law 
from nature, their starting points with regard to morality are 
quite different. ~ben ilippias separated law from nature, his 
reason for so doing was the diversity and contradictory character 
of existing laws. Hlpplae, then, rejected law and followod what 
he supposed to be nature. Not so Protagoras. Protagoras t eif. 
flcultywas epistemolosical. He began from tho principle that 
"man is the measure of till things, of things that are, that they 
are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.,,47 The 
conclusion he drew from this principle wa~ that nature did not 
exist, but only l~w.48 At first, this seems like a strange de-
duction from such a premise. After all, man is the measure of 
-
all things. Since being is the object of mants intellect, what-
ever man cannot know, in some way at least, does not have being, 
and hence does not exist. The explanation of the conclusion, 
however, l1es not in the major premise of Protagoras' argument, 
but in the minor: man cannot know nature, Human cognition tor 
Protagoras was sense cognition, and sense cognitlon Is alwa.ys of 
particulars. Therefore, any thine as universal as nature certain-
ly lies outside the scope of man's knowledge, is not "'measured" 
48 
bY man, and hence does not exist. But laws surely did eXist. 
They were particulars and humanly knowable. Therefore Protagoras 
admitted the validity of laws, but based their validity not on 
nature--since nature was a non-entity;--not on divine decree--he-
cause a senslst must be at least an agnostic in things divine;49. 
but on the only thing a sensist could appeal to: convention. 
Sophocles opposes the Protagorean sensist1c norm of 
morality with the conventional concept of the unwritten laws of 
heaven. Creon of the ~tlgone is the proponent of the former, 
Antigone herself of the latter. The conflict which arises from 
the clash of these two ideas forms tlw intellectual basis for the 
tragedy of the play. Jaeger, commenting on the Antigone, tells 
us: 
Hegel saw that the Antigone dealt with the tragic con ... 
flict of two moral pr!riclp!es: the law ot the state, and 
the rights ot the family. Fram this point ot view, the 
severe though exaggerated logiC ot king Creon's devotion 
to the state makes his character easier for us to un-
derstand; wrule the agony and defiance ot Antigone jus-
tify the eternal laws of family duty against the inter-
ference of the state, with the irre~istable persuasive-
ness of true revolutionary passlon.~O 
Sophocles sympathized with the proSressive spirit of 
the Sophists as long as that spirit contained itself within the 
physical order.51 But when the infatuated intellect of the "En-
49 Diels, Fra~ente, 80 B 4. 
50 Paid.ia, I, 279. 
51 Qt. choral ode in the Antisone, 332-375. 
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lightened" invaded the moral order, there to make man the center 
of the universe by making him a law unto himself--as Kant was to 
do centuries later--Sophocles perceived with keen insight the ter-
rible catastrophe such a move foreboded. For Sophocles, religion 
\fas the foundation of good living. whether in the social or 1n 
the individual sphere. It was the foundation of sane po11tics as 
well as sane ethics.52 And if that foundat10n were to be under-
mined through the mach1nations of the "enlightened progressives," 
the entire superstructure would crash to the ground. Hence, he 
moves in the Antigone to enlist to his vital cause the sympathies 
of hIs contemporaries. lie does so by drawing the vague abstrac-
tions ot Prot agoras down to the ugly concrete of a Creon, and by 
plaCing in immediate juxtaposition to this ugliness the beautitul 
and pathetic loyalty of Antigone to the decrees of eternal law. 
James Adam says of these eternal laws in Sophocles: 
"One of the most noteworthy and fUndamental of the religious ide-
as to be found in Sophocles is that of an immutable moral order 
or law, the orig1n and '1anction of which are alike divine.,,5.3 
T~ese are the vd~o, ~.(~o~e~ already referred to in the Oed12us 
Tlrannus.vo~o, o6pa.v{a.v ~,' a.(aipa. 'tel(.vwetv"u:~, J,v "O).\)~~o~ 
na.~p ~dvo', "laws called lnto 11fe throughout the high clear 
burgh, 
52 
53 
192.3, 
Nestle, nSoI!hokles ~.91!. Sophistik," 143. 
James Adam, The Rell!iOUS Teachers of Greece, Edin-
Lecture VIII,-WSophoe es," !6$. --
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beaven, whose father 1s Olympus alo'no."54 Those arc the v& ... ' .... « 
"hleh ,!i.:loctra observes ~Q. ZT)vc!,<: 16al~t: I Q.. "by piety towards 
ZeuS, It and this, eVen though she 1s seen i3'~~Ol v 'v ,""olpt; o6x '0-
91t.q, "in no prosperous Euatate. tl55 These &1"e the O(U",,&\I(,)v VOIJ.O&. 
"laws or the divInItIes," which r~enelaus would abusG b,. prevont-
ins the burial ot Ajax, the 6e&>v \16 .... 0 l. "laws or tho gods, 11 Asa-
mermon would dishonor by insultIng a dead hero.56 
It 1s not to be thought, or course, that Sophoclcs de-
nied altogether the validity of man~de laws. The poInt at 1s-
sue was not who thor hUman laws wore valid or not I but whence 
they derived their validity. It they were bindIng ot themselvos, 
they were aubject to no limItatIons. rt, however, they drew 
tbeIJ:t force tJ.-om the "law eternal in the heavens, beyond and 
above all trana1torJ human 1awl,"$7 then human law could not vIo-
late tho lImits set for it by the eternal • 
• 
54 OedlE~ :lUennu..s, 86$-868. 
55 Electra. 1093-1096. . , 
S6 AJ!A, 1130, 1)43-1)45. 
57 Adam, T:~fJ R~11.s1,ou,s TOicher., 168. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DIVINE LAW 
The moral content of Sophocles' plays is not chiefly 
negative, He does indeed attack. the Sophists through the medium 
of his verse, He tells us what the measure of human action is 
not. But he does so, only that it may be understood the more 
clearly what the norm of morality is. 
Sophocles possessed to an eminent degree that quality 
for which Greek artists and writers are outstanding 1n the world 
of art and letters: the love of ~ony. SOplloc1es had a passion 
for harmony--not so much for the physical proportion achieved in 
sculpture, in musiC, in architecture, or even in verse, thcugh he 
had this too. The laws of physical harmony had long since been 
discovered and developed to perfection. Sophocles was interested 
primarily in the hal~ony of the soul, in moral harmony,l The 
physical balance and proportion, the sOEhros1ge, Which character-
izes Sophocles' poetry is not an end in itself. It is rather a 
very apt medium tor giving expression to tllat higher soPhroszq~, 
1 Jaeger, Paidela, I, 276. 
51 
the balance and proportion of a soul ruled by justice.2 
The moral universe of Aescylean drama is one of "storm 
and stress.") B.Uripides highlights the apparent contradictions 
present in the divine government of the world. Sophocles, while 
he nis by no means unconscious of the discordant elements in hu-
man 11fe and destiny," devotes his main efforts to the reconcili-
ation of these elements, to the establishment of harmony, of 
peace.4 Balance and proportion we~ for Sophocles the principles 
of all existence,S and the principle of balance and proportion in 
the moral order is the measuring rod of human acts, whatever that 
measure may be. From this it can be judged what an important 
position the norm of morality holds in the art and doctrine ot 
Sophocles. 
TtL8 question now arises, what is the norm of morality 
in Sophocles? He has rejected nere nature as the measure of hu-
man activity. He has rejected human law as the fundamental norm. 
The Sophists bad divorced law from nature and were divided in 
their espousal of the one or the other as the norm of morality. 
But Sophocles approached the question of the norm from the stand-
2 !E.!2.., 274. 
3 Adam,!h! Religious Teachers, 163. 
4 ~. 
5 Jaeger, Paideia, 27~. 
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point of the~dlvine. To Sophocles' way of thinking there is no 
laW higher than the unwritten law of Zeus. The chorus of the 
oedipus ~y!annus prays that it may speak those words and do those 
-
deeds for which 
v&~o, ~poxe1v~~' 
u,(~o6t~, o~p~vlav 
0,' «(eipa ~tx~weiv~e~, ~v -OAU~~O~ 
~a~no ~ovo~, ouol vav 
eva~l ~U01~ ~vlpwv 
l'tlX't'tV. 
laws have been set forth, moving 
on high, called into lite through-
out the high clear heaven, whose 
father is Olympus alone; thelr6par-ant was no race of mortal men. 
In language still more revealing, Antigone proclaims the guprema-
oy of divine law as the measure of right and wrone: 
oJ l&g ~l ~o, z,~~ ~v & X~PUt4' ~'oe, 060 ~ ¥~vo,xo' ~~v x~'tw ee~v Alx~ 
, ." " .'!_ • r • ~o,ouoo tv «vepw~o'o,v wp,oev vo~oo~ 
0601 oeeve,v ~ooo6'tov ~~~v ~a 04 
x~puy~e', ~O't' Iyp«.'tu xao'«A~ eeGv VO~l~« O~v4oe~1 evTf'Cov Sve' d.tpOpa\J-eTv· 
Yes; tor it was not Zeus that had pub-
lished me that edict; not such are the 
laws set among men by the Justice who 
dwells with the gods below; nor deemed 
I that thy decrees were ot such torce, 
that a mortal could override the tm-
written and unfailing statutes of heav-
en. 7 
Where human law and divine law conf1~ct, it is human law that 
must give way. There is human law and di,,'ine law in Sophocles, 
6 oedi:Eus 'll!annu,s, 86,5-870. 
7 Ae~lsone, 450-455. 
'" but the human is steadfastly and emphatically subordinated to the 
supreme law ot heaven. 
It is not to be thought that Sophocles was original in 
hiS ideas about the norm ot morality_ Rommen states that the 
same view was held by all peoples in the early periods of their 
history. Customs and laws were not distinguished trom the norms 
of religion, and were considered as being exclusively divine in 
origin, It is noteworthy that such laws, though they cannot al-
ways properly be called natural, had nevertheless two of the es-
sential properties of natural law. They were immutable, in the 
sense that they could not be changed by human decrees; and they 
~ere universal in their application.8 
To say that the fundamental norm of morality according 
to Sophocles was divine in origin does not explain the poet's 
view fully. The question remains, what did Sophocles mean by Si-
vine? Did he entertain the traditional ideas of the Greeks con-
cerning the hierarchy of Olympus, or did he manage at all to rise 
above theM into an atmosphere clearer with truth? The question is 
a difficult one to answer with any finality, because the evidence 
does not point clearly to anyone conclusion. At times Sophocles 
seems to accept the tradItional belief in the Olympian mythology, 
where the gods are little more than preternatural men, Again, at 
8 Hommen, lh! natural l!!!., 3-4. 
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other times he seems to penetrate to the truth that there is but 
one God, who is all powerful, the principle ot law and justice. 
Perhaps a resolution of this discrepancy 1s to be 
found in the tact that Sophocles writes as a poet. Thus, "[rile 
took contentedly the orthodox view ot the hierarchy of Olympus, ~19 
but he took it tor its poetic value only, much as Horace in later 
years was to include in his odes popular beliets in the existence 
and nature ot Hades, though his own philosophy precluded such be-
liefs. But in those passages where "the poet seems to be speak-
lng his own thoughts, [he elevates] Zeus • • • into a supreme de-
:tty ot justice and truth."lO Tl~t Sophocles!!! speaking his own 
thoughts when he conceived at Zeus as something more than the 
thunderer of Olympus is evidenced by the fact that his ideas on 
the no~ ot morality postulated such a Zeus. Something has al-
ready been said about the love of harmony that motivated Sopho-
cles toward his concept of the moral order. Given this tact, 
James Adam reasons thus: 
A further question naturally suggests itself 1n connec-
tion with Sophocles' beliet in a single all-embracing 
plan or purpose according to whioh the world is ruled. 
If there is a unity of purpose, must there not also be 
a unity of power?11 
9 Edith Hamilton, The Greek Waz to Western C1v111za-
~. New York, 1949, 146. - - , 
10 Evelyn Abbot, "The Theology and Eth1cs ot Sophoo1es, 
He11en1ea, London, 1880, 38. 
11 ~ Re11s1o~s ~eaohers, 116. 
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Adams answers Z!!, and explains that flthe polytheism of Sophocles 
.as 'if not nominally, at least practically monotheism.' fl12 
Evelyn Abbot not only calls Sophocles! Zeus nO. supreme deity of 
justice and truth,ltl) but goes so tar as to attribute to him the 
following attributes: 6ternalrule in heaven; exaltation beyond 
human power; justice and righteousness 01' rule; possession 01' a 
kingdom founded not on caprice, but on law; power eternal and im-
mutable.14 
In establishing the fundamental norm of morality as di-
vine law, Sophocles posed for hi;nself a deep problem to solve: 
how to explain the tremendous amount of suftering and pain in the 
world. The appeal 01' the Sophistic morality to the common mind 
lay preCisely in this, that it claimed to l~ve the answer to the 
problem of suffering. Live according to our norm of morality, 
said the Sophists, and you wl11 do away with suffering. Advo-
cates 01' the Wl11-of.the-Stronger theory guaranteed that the su.t'-
fering of the strong, at least, would be eliminated. The carpe-
~ morality, on the other hand, the pleasure-of-the-moment 
philosophy, promised freedom from pain for everyone. 1be Pro-
tagorean positivists, 1n their turn, saw escape trom suffering in 
suitable human laws. But what had Sophocles to offer the sufter-
12 Ibid. 
-
13 "The Theology and Ethics ot Sophocles," )8. 
14 !.2!.9.., 40. 
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er, with his unchanging divine law as the measure of right and 
wrong? It was obvious that the world was full of people who fol-
lowed this norm to the best of their knowledge: Antigones, Phil .. 
octetes', Dejaneiras, Oedipus'; and stlll it could not be denied 
that these same people suffered; often, indeed, mo~e than the 
guilty suffered. 
The divine Author of law was for Sophocles not only. 
mighty in His decrees, but also just. 15 Sophocles t faith in the 
divine justice and goodness was profound; so profound, in fact, 
that it was this piety, joined with his equally deep sympathy tor 
human suffering, which enabled him to draw tragic characters on 
16 
such a grand seale. Oedipus in the Coloneus calls down terri-
ble curses on his sons because he is confident that ~ uaAa('G~O' 
A(X~ tuvcOp&' ['o~,] z~vA' 4pxalol' vo~o'" "Justice, revealed 
from ot old, sits with Zeus ln the might of the eternal laws."17 
The gods are not indifferent as to who keep the divine law and 
who break It. Rather, says the same Oedipus, 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • .nvefoSe Ot .' 
PA£K'LV ~tv uV~ou, [geou'1 ~p&' ~&v edoe~~ ~po~~v pA£~e,v Ot upo' ~ou, Ouooepef', ~uyerv od ~ou 
~~~ yeve09ul ~&, 4voalou pp~~v. 
deem that they look on the god-fearing among men, 
and on the godless, and that never yet hath es-
15 Oedipus Tzrannus, 871, 885. 
16 
G,z:eek :t:,oetrx. 
17 
R.C. Jebb~ The Growth and Influence of 
London, ltl9J.Z09. - -
Oedl~~s Colo~epSI 1381-1382. 
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cape~be~n round tor an impious mortal on the 
earth.1ts 
.5a 
It, then, the gods dlstln~llsh between the p10us and th 
impious, the innocent and the guIlty, 1n meting out punIsmr.ent, 
hoW explaIn the tact that not only the guilty, but also the in-
nocent sufter? Sophocles offers a twotold answer to this prob-
lem ... ·or, rather, a single anSYlor with a twotold aspect. lIe would 
justify the surterloe of the innocent on the grounds both ot the 
here and of the hereatter. 
Chief among th.e beneti ts aceNlne from sutterlng in thls 
11fe 1s the eduoative power of auttering. "Man learns, first, 
that he has unsuspeoted powers of passive endurance, ot tl~o,­
!m!- !Ie leams too that his w111 is tree; h1s motives may still 
be pure, whatever the fell hand ot circumstance may bring.n19 
Aged oedipus learned thIs les80n after many years ot intense suf-
fering: a~ipye,v yap ~r ~de~. ~& xp6vo~ tuvmv ~xp&~ O&OdOX£l. 
"for patient endurance 1s the lesson or suttering, and at the 
years in our long rellowshlP.n20 ~ipy£,v. "aoquiescence," "pa_ 
tient endurance," 18 tho word Phl10etetea uses too as he ex.p1aIns 
to Keoptolemua the lesson learned trom hardship; 
p r 
oT~e& yap ouo' av o~~~a&v ~&v~v eeav 
4AAOV Aa~&v~~ .A~V l~oG ~A~V~' ~&oe· 
16 ~bld.. 218-281. 
19 Greene, Mql£&. 141. 
20 2e.C\~P.l!" Co!2nGUI" 1-8. 
l 
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iy~ 0' 4v4yxn ~POU~GeOV a~£pye,v X~X4. 
Por I believij that the bare sight would 
have deterred any other man from enduring 
such a lot; but I have been slowly schooled 
by necessity to patience.21 
'ltCeU ""cleo', Itwe learn by suffering."22 We learn pa-
tient endurance; but that is not all. Suffering gave the aged 
oedipus more than tlemoszee. It, mellowed him, and it enliBhtened 
23 him. It gave him a broader Vision, in which he might understanc 
and appreciate more fully his own destiny. It gave htm a keen in-
sight into character, and a deep and sweet sympathy with the suf-
ferings of his fellow men: for, ~OAA' tV xaxoTo& eu~o' euv~eer, 
op4, "a soul steeped in trials sees much.11~ 
Theseus too, that paragon ot nobility in the Oed~pus 
Coloneus, had suffered much: 11, 1tAITo~'&.v~p 41ti ,£v~' ~A~04 
x~vOuveu~'C' tv ~~ xd.pq., tlin strange lands [I] wrestled with 
perils to my life, as no man beside. n25 And Theseus recognized 
that it was his Buftering which had lighted in his soul fires ot 
generosity and planted there the seeds ot sympathy: 
• 1. I a '.1''4 ,. • if wo~e ~~vov y v ouo~v ove , wo'ltep au vvv, 
21 ~_il_o_e ..... te_t_e .... s, 535-537. 
22 Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 177. 
23 Adam,!h! Reli&lous Teachers, 172. 
24 Lewis Campbell, ~ophoeles, Oxford, 1891, II, 538, 
Frag. 595. 
25 oedi~8 Coloneus, 563-56~. 
.. " '.1 '.~ ." UXCX~p'«xo,~~v ~II ou auvtXO~'C1V 'XCI !~O'O' Avnp ~v, x~, ~~~ e' «Gplov 
ouoev XA&OV ~o, 006 ~l~&~lV ~~&p«'. 
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Never, then, would I turn aside tram a etrang-
er, such as thou art now, or refuse aid in his 
deliverance; for well know I that I am a man, 
and that in thQ6morrow my portion is no great-er than thlne.2 
In suffering Sophocles saw the circumstance of li~e 
which, more than any other, served to raise man to his greatest 
dignlty.27 Sophocles. characters are not passive in the face of 
suffering. Suffering does not destroy them or debase them. 
Rather, n (d] ramatic action is for Soph.ocles the process by which 
the true nature of a suffering human being 1s unfolded, by which 
he fulfills his destiny, and through it fulfills himself. nZ8 
The educative value of Butfering is largely indiVidual. 
But Sophocles sees other fruits of pain and trial that have a 
more far-reaching influence. The suttering of Antigone, for ex-
~lple. serves to establish more firmly in the minds of men the 
divine law for which she sacrifices herse1f.29 "Sophocles seems 
to invite us to lift our eyes from the suffering of the individU-
al to a consideration of the ulterior purposes which Providence 
26- Ibid., 565-568. 
-
27 Alfred and Maurice Croiset,t An Abridged Historz .2! 
Greek Literature, New York, 1904, 207-20~. 
28 Jaeger, Pa1de1a, 281. 
29 Abbot, "[the Theology and Ethics of Sophocles," 59. 
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is thereby seeking to fultlll. n )O Dejaneirats tragic error and 
its oonsequenoes were the appointed means whereby Heraoles should 
be released trom a life ot toil and attain to 1mmortality.)1 
philoctetes' suffering on the island ot Le~~os would tind its res-
olution in the overthrow ot Troy. Neoptolemus clearly saw the 
band ot the divine in Phlloctetes' wretched trials, and he saw thE 
glorious end to which those trials were ordained: 
o~O~v ~ou~~v eau~ao~oy !~ol' 
eeTa vdp, eixep x&y~ ~, 0pOV&, 
., ~ r l, • X«l 14 ~aalj~a~a xe va ~p.o~ au~ov 
~~~ W~O~eOYO~ Xpuo~~ 'xe~~, 
xef vuv a xover olXa xnOe~ov~v, 
o&x tOS' W, o~ ge&v ~ou *eA~~U' 
"toO ~I) 1tgo"tepov ~ovo' ~1l' TpolCf 
r • ~ , 1 ,~ ~e val "ta gewv a~a~~a ~e~~t 
xply ~O' ttux~, xPOYO', ~ Aeye"t41 
xp~va, o~ U1tO ~wyOe Oa~~ya,. 
Nought of this is a marvel to me. 
By heavenly ordinance, if suoh as 
I may judge, those first sufterlngs 
oame on him trom relentless ahryse; 
and the woes that now he bears by 
the providenoe of some god, that so 
he should not bend agaInst Troy the 
resistless shatts divine, till the 
time be fulfIlled when, as men say, 
Troy is fated by those shafts to 
tall.)2 
But it was not only toward final viotory at Troy that 
Phl10otetes' Bufter1ngs were direoted. His trials were ordered 
)0 Adam, ~ Religious Teaohers, 113. 
31 llli., 114.. 
32 Philoctetes, 191-200. 
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to his own personal glory as well. Heracles himself, in his 
deus-ex-machina appearance near the end of the play, assures ;;;;..;-- -
Philoctetes of this: 
xal aot, aa~' fae •• ~Oo~' 6~&{A&~a, ~«a£rv, 
lx ~wv novwv ~wvO' &JxA£4 StaS«, ploy. 
And for thee, be sure, the destiny is or-
dained that through these thy sufferings 
thou shouldest glorify thy llfe,3J 
Perhaps that view ot undeserved suffering ls most pe-
culiarly Sophoclean which regards the pains ot the innocent as 
part of the general ha~nony of tho universe. It was Sophocles t 
passion tor harmony that led him to seek for a unity of law in th~ 
moral order. It 1s that same passion which leads him to consider 
sufferlng as a dissonance whlch plays a contributing though sub-
ordinate part in the larger symphonic consonance of the world. 
"[T]he moral order ot the world does not ot necessity mean the 
happiness of all men. From some it may demand endurance and sac-
rlfice.".34 It 1s not only t?~at suttering is not incompatible 
with the general harmony in which Sophocles never ceased to have 
faith; but these very discords of 8uffering serve to promote and 
enhance that universal harmony,35 much in the same way that the 
discords ot polyphonic music enhance the resolutions which fol-
33 ~., l421-l422. 
34 Abbot, "The Theology and Ethics of Sophocles," 59. 
35 Adam,!h!. Relisious Teachers, 175. 
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lOW them, or the gargoyles on a medieval cathedral enhance the 
barmony of the whole_ The dissonance of the symphony is a condi-
tion ot the resolution. Without the one the other is impossible, 
since there is nothing to resolve. So, "undeserved sufferlng, 
while it Is exhibited in Sophocles under various lights, always 
appears as part of the permitted evil which is a condltion of a 
just and harmonlously ordered universe_ n36 
Atter all the arguments have been placed on the other 
side ot the scale to try to counterbalance the weight ot sufter-
lng, we stIll tind, as the ancient Greeks must have found, that 
the weight ot suttering is the greater. Sophocles, who was deep. 
1'1 convinced that God was just as well as mighty in his laws, 
could not help but face the tact that, in spite of all he said ot 
development ot character, of personal di&~ity, of universal har-
mony, God in allowing the innocent to sutter was unjust, unless--
unless there were an atter ... lite in which the dissonance could be 
fully resolved. Sophocles recognized, says W.C. areene, that 
[i1 t • • • the ultimate justice ot the gods is to be up-
held, it is not because they always prevent the suttering 
ot noble heroes and give them material success but rath-
er beca.use they somehow provide that undeserved sur.rer-
ing be crowned by compensations of another order, com-
pensations which vary with circumstances .3'7 
London, 
S.H. Butcher, Some Aspects of the Greek Genius, 121. - •. --
J'lToira, 141. Italics not in the origlnal. 
I 
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sut there will be cases, such as Antigonets, where the only othe~ 
order possible in which the suffering can be justly compensated 
is the order of an after-life. 
What does Sophocles hold on the existence and nature of 
the after-life? The question is not an easy one to answer. Quo-
tations can be multiplied to show that Sophocles believed in a 
11fe after death; but it Is more difficult to sOlmd his mind on 
the kind of life he believed in. Thus. Antigone says that she 
-
owes allegiance to the dead, a greater allegiance, in tact, than 
to the living, exef yap ~£l x£loo~a" "in that world I shall 
abide tor ~er."38 She says that heraotion may appear blameless 
in the next life: ~l, oTaev et x~~weev £6ey~ ~~Oe; "Who knows but 
this seems blameless in the world belo'fl?,t39 Herac1es reports in 
the Philoctetes that he has won 'edV4~OV &pe~~v, W, ~4peo9' apav, 
"deathless glory, as thou beholdest."4o Eleet~a asks Chrysothe-
mis if she thin:ks thei~ dead father will acoept kindly the gifts 
sent by his wife to his tomb.41 Even here, of course, where it 
Is merely a question of the existence of an after-lIfe, it cannot 
always be said for certain that the sentiments uttered by Soph-
38 Ant1sone, 76. 
39 Ie.!J., .521. 
q.O Phl1octetes, 1420. 
41 Eleot~a, 442-443. 
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oeles! characters are his own. This is all the more true beca.use 
of the fact that those senti:'11ents are quite widely divergent as 
to the nature of tho a.tter-life. 
There are three views on the nature of the after-lite 
to be found in Sophocles. Some of his characters see in death a 
giver of eternal sleep; others believe in the arter-life of the 
Homertc Hades; and still others seem to reach a higher concept of 
it, a concept which overreaches the grossness of the first two. 42 
Thus, the chorus of the Oedipus Col,oneus calls upon Death, the 
son of Earth ~~d Tartarus, as the "giver of eternal sleep": o~ 
'tot lU XA:f}OXW 't&v at &vu'Jtvov, 43 and Antigone refers to Hades as 
'Jt~yxol'ta~, ngiver of sleep to all."44 The chorus of the OediRus 
Tyrannus,' on the other hand, represents lite upon life speeding 
like a winged bird or resistless fire 4X't4V 'Jtp~' lo'Jtipou B£06, 
"to the shore of the western god,tt4S remind1ng one of the Hom.erie 
EreboB in the west. The ohorus of the qedi~u8 Qoloneu~ prays tha 
Oedipus may pass without pain X4'tW vexpwv ~Aax~ xal B'tUy,ov O&~ov 
"to the fields of the dead below, the all-enshrouding, and to the 
stygian house."46 It 1s nt)teworthy that in this reference to the 
42 Adam, !h! HeliSious Teachers, 180-181. 
43 Oedipq8 Coloneus, 1518. 
414- Antigon,e, 808. 
45 Oedl;a:us nrannu~, 177. 
46 Oedipus Coloneus, 1563.,1564. 
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Homeric after-Itte (all such references, of course, ~ easi17 
be interpreted as a potical expression of a more orthodox view), 
we have a very clear allusion by the poet to the very point in 
which we are interested: a just retribution in a future lite. 
For the chorus adds to the 11nes just quoted: 
~OAA~V ylp !v xef ~d~av 
~~~4~WV txvou~tvwV . 
~4A'V 0.& [otoluoOa] o41~v O{xal0~ 4G~O'. 
Many were the sorrows that came to him 
without cause; bU~7in requital a just god 
will lift him up.~ 
Antigone turnishes us with ml example of the third concept ot the 
after-lite reterred to above. Going to her death, she foresees 
a more substantial existence 1n the after-lite than that ot an 
eternal sleeper or a Homeric shade: 
'4e060« ~lV~OL xap~' 'v lAulo,v ~p.t~ 
,tA~ ~lv n~e,v ua~pr, ~p'OO"A~~ Ot aol, 
~~&P, .IATI ol ooi, xaolyv~ov xapa. 
But I cherish good hope that my coming 
will be welcome to my father, and pleas-
ant to thee, my mpther, and welcome, 
brother, to thee.40 
Thus does she see 1n the future, it not a reward for her heroic 
action, at least relea.se from her sorroW'. She has hope. But by 
far the most exalted concept of the after-lite found in Sophocles, 
and one whioh, because of its unique eharacter, we teol to be his 
own, 1s the following, enunoiated by Heracles in the Philoctotos: 
47 !2!a., 1565-1567. 
48 Antigone, 896-898. 
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." '.f' .1 ' W, ~aAAa uav~a OeU~ep ljyer~al ua~~p 
Zeu'- o~ lAp ~ai~e,« 9uv~vijaxe, ~po~or,· 
xuv ~wa, xav 8avwo&v, oux axoAAu~a,. 
All things else are of less account in the 
sight of our father Zeus; for piety dies 
not with men; in their4lite and in their death, it is immortal. 9 
What, then, are we to conclude from the evidence about 
Sophocles' belief in an atter-lire ot retribution? Dronke says 
vhat irn.mortality 1s "tb.a natural crown and coping-stone" of the 
t'eligion of Sophocles, snd that therefore we are bound to attri-
~ute the belief' to h1m50 __ an .! Erioz;l argur.l.ent. Churton Col11ns, 
m the other hand, says, "It 1s qu1te impossible to say on whlch 
,ide the balance of probability really inolines," whether it is 
POI" or against the beliet in immortalitySl--he argues .! posteri-
~. Adams straddles the fence and says he does not feel just1-
~ied in attributing to Sophocles "a sure belief in immortality.u52 
n view of the trequent references to the after-life in Sophocles-
~nd these, not only in one play, but in them all--and in view of 
IIhe general tone of these references (the spirit in which many of 
ilhem are uttered gives us every reason to believe they are Soph-
)cles' own), we are safe, it would seem, 1n adopting for ourselves 
~he conclusion hvalyn Abbot draws on the point: "We see then that 
49 Philoctetes, l442 ... 1444. 
50 Adam, ~ Religious Teachers, 180. , 
51 Ibid. 
-
52 Ibid., 182. 
-
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in a certain sense compensation comes to those who sufter inno-
cently .... such compensatIon as a noble spirit would seek to gain. ,,5: 
And again: 
Hence tor the righteous there 1s a good hope in death, 
and the life to come Is a real existence in which the 
broken ties of this world will be united, never to be 
severed again. • • • By thus conveying the mind to an-
other lite, Sophocles !a some mel!ure sottens the 'weight 
of injustice and misery lIi"'t1'iis.::rq: 
The in 80me measure ot this statement is full of slg-
-_ ....................... -
nlficance; and we would not be giving a complete picture ot Soph-
ocles' mind on the norm of morality and its consequences 1t we 
failed to explain somewhat this restrictive phrase. 
The Sophists had placed great emphasis on the fact that 
their various systems ot morality, whether based upon human law 
alone or on nature alone, did away with the one thing men were 
most anxious to avoid: sutfering. Their claims were decidedly 
optimistIc, and if Sophocles was to propose an effective counter-
appeal to the common man, his divine-law proposal too had to be 
opttmistic with ~egard to the question of suffering. We have 
seen that Sophocles' best argument for 'au optimistic outlook on 
life was the belief in an arter-life of reward tor those who fo1-
lowed the divine law and of punishment for those who did not. 
53 Abbot, "The Theology and Ethics of Sophocles," 61. 
54 ~., Italics not in the original. 
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Since sophocies t optimism depended thus upon his belief in a fu-
ture life of reward or punishment, it followed that the intensi-
ty of that optimism would be directly proportionate to the so-
lidity of his belief in the after-life. The evidence of the playa 
forces us to conclude that Sophocles' belief in an atter-lite of 
reward and punishment was not as strong as it might have bean. 
But what &lse could be expected when the belief rested upon human 
reason alone? 
In the moments when Sophocles lost sight of the truth oj 
a future life, and they are not intrequent. his view of the pres-
ent life became quite cheerless, and he placed little value upon 
existence. He was disposed at these tlmes to emphasize "the 
Nlchtiskeit of human 1ife."55 This seems to have been Sophocles' 
state of mind as he ended the Trachiniae. Maracles' son, Hyllus, 
brings the play to a close with words of gloom and bitterness 
towards the gods. Reflecting upon his father's great misfortune, 
he says: 
r 
70 
as fathers, and yet they can look 
upon such sufferings. No man fore-
sees the future; but the present is 
traught with mourning for us, and 56 
with shame for the powers above. • • 
Sophocles finds no end ot fuel to feed the fire of his 
pessimism. The gods he conceives ot as jealous ot the power ot 
men.57 The gods intervene so that the evil man overcomes the 
good.58 Not only do the gods heap evil upon men, but they 80 
blind men that the evil seems good to them; and thus do men hurl 
themselves to ruin in the pursuit at an apparent good.59 It the 
sons of Oedipus have set thell' hearts on kingly power and pur-
sued it In evil rivalry, it is because some god has intatuated 
them, L"'ld has moved them to their deslr8.60 And s1 nce the power 
of the gods Is supreme, when they move man to evil, there is no 
hope tor him. Sophocles draws a PhI10ctetes who is overwhelmed 
by mIsfortune, and who can fInd no explanation for his lot except 
61 in the jealousy of the goda. He had wronged none by force or 
by fraud, he had lived at peace with his fellow-men; yet the gods 
56 Trachiniae, 1266-1273. 
57 Ajax, 758-761. 
58 illS., lP4-455. 
59 Antisone, 622-625. 
60 Oedipus Coloneus, 371-373. 
61 Ph11octet~s, 776-778. 
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abandoned him eo a cruel tate.62 Phl10ctetes perceives that it is 
the way ot the gods to heap ButfeX'ing and destruction on the good, 
and to allow the evll to prosper. His experiences at Troy have 
taught him that nOAe~o~ odOev' «vOp' ~x~Y a.lper 1tOV~POV, ¢AAQ. 
~OU~ xp~a'tou~ 'el, "war takes no evil man by choice, but good men 
always."63 Hls reflections on the injustice of the gods in thus 
rewarding the evil and punishing the good lead him to cry out witt 
bitte;tt sarcasm: 
ne, 0 O~v ~~ x«xov y aX~At~O #, 8.1 ! '/.t 
lAA' e x,p'9~eAAoua,v u~~~ o«l~ovt~, 
xul n~~ ~d ~£V ~uvoGpyu xu; ~aA'V~P&i~ 
, " .£... l'" , Xa,pouo ava~p~ov~£~ E~ AOou, ~a 0 
olx(uQ. xul "to. xpr,O't' U1tO<7'teAAouo' uti. 
11:06 XP~ 'tleea9a.l 'ta.G'ta., noG 0' a.Cverv, ~'ta.v 
'to. etr £1ta.,v~v ~o~, Seou' IOP~ xaxou'j 
No evil thing has been known to perish; no, 
the gods take tender care of such, and have 
a strange joy In tu~ing back trom Hades all 
thingc villainous and knavish, while they are 
ever sending the just and the good out ot 
lite. How am I to deem ot these things, or 
wheX'ein shall I praise them, when, praising 
the ways 9f the gods, I tind that the gods 
are evl1?b4 
The thoughtlessness of youth, Sophocles concedes, renders that 
period of lite easier. But when youth is gone, man ls subject to 
all kinds of affliction and suffering: envy, factions, strife, 
battles, and slaughters; and finally old age claims him, d1s-
62 Ibld., 68~-686. 
63 ~., 436-437. 
64 ~., 446-4,52. 
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praised old age, infirm, unsociable, unbefriended old age, with 
"hieh ltp01tflV1;fl Xa.X4 xQ.xli'>v ~uvon(.er, "all woe of woe abides. n65 
Their hearts oppressed with the eloam of these pessunistic 
thoughts, the chorus of the CediESs Coloneus utters a dreadful 
sentence, one whioh shocks us profoundly even though it comeR 
from the pen of an ancient pagan. It is the consummation of pes-
simism: 
~~ ,GVfli ~&v !~a.V1;a. VLX' AOYOV: 1;& 0' ~lte{ 'Q.~n, 
e~va., XerSEV ~e£v lttp ~e, 1tOAU Oeu1;epov ~, 1;Cf,X&01;a.. 
Not to be bom ls, past all prizing, best; but, when 
a man hath seen the light, this is next best by far, 
that with all speed he should go thither, whence he 
hath come.o6 
The pessimistiC strain in Sophoclean drama. resulted in 
large part, no doubt, from the literary traditions to which he 
was heir, and trom the enviztonment in which he lived. The lyztic 
poets had harped a great deal on the sadness of life. Mimnermus 
had pointed out the emptiness of life, once the joys of youth 
had expired. Solon, in his dialogue with Croesus, had emphaslzed 
the unstable character of success, even when one was fortunate 
enouel1 to attain it. And parallels can be found in Herodotus to 
most ot the other pessimistic sentiments expressed by SoPhocles.6 
One could not have turned the tide of such a literary stream in a 
65 OediPHs Colone~s, 1230-1238. 
66 IbId., 1225-1226. 
-
61 Abbot, "The Theology and Ethics of Sophocles," 50. 
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ay--not even a genius of Sophoclos' stature. The conditions of 
he times, moreover, must have exerted an influence on Sophocles' 
tind toward pessimism. War was the order of the day. There were 
.'ew families without their lIar-dead--at any time a somber Influ ... 
~nce on onets WeltanschauuB6_ And the times of peace did not 
oring much improvement. ~~e struggle to get ahead was a fierce 
ne. The strong won out, and tew pitied the weak. All rejoiced 
t the misto~tunes of their enemies. Revenge was exalted to the 
tatue of a virtue. One could have combated the pessimism sug-
ested by these ha.rsh conditions of l1fe only through a firm and 
biding faith in the existence of God, in His justiee, in the cer-
alnty of an after-life of reward and punishment. Sophocles had 
his faIth, but it was neither firm nor abiding. Thus, Sophocles 
ierced frequentlr enough the gloom of pessimism with the bright 
an inspiring optimlsm.--but he did not dispel it. 
CHAPTf~R V 
EVALUATION 
The light wInch the Sophistic morality throws on the 
Sophoclean norm does much to brine out the true character of the 
latter. But Sophoclean moz-ality cannot be appreciated in its ful 
colors until it is placed, along with the doctrine of the Soph-
ists, against a backdrop of the orthodox doctrine on the norm of 
morality. The influence that the Sophists had on Sophocles has 
al~ady been pointed out. It remains now to examine the OPPOSing 
tenets of the two sohools by the criterion of sollolastic doctrine 
and evaluate them accordingly. 
It must be mentioned here, parenthetlcally, that while 
an inquiry of this sort is necessary to a complete treatment of 
the subject of the thesis, it also entails a danger. The criter-
ion to be used in evaluating Sophooles and the SOi,)hists was not 
itself worked out fully except with the aid of divine revelation 
and several hundred years of subsequent thought. It 1s obvious 
that unless this fact is kept in mind a serious injustice can be 
done to Sophocles and the men he opposed, when their doctrInes 
are weighed against the true one. The danger can be avoided, how· 
ever, by keeping a correct sense of historical proportion. The 
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purpose of this chapter is not to condemn either the Sophists or 
Sophocles for failing to see what was virtually impossible for 
them to see, nor even to show how short their several doctrines 
fell of the true norm. The shortcomings will indeed be pointed 
out, but only that the ancient doctrines themselves may be the 
better compared and appreciated. It 1s as if we were to use a 
color we know to ue pure 1n order to examine the relation one to 
another of two sl18de8 whose purity we suspect. 
The true doctrine on the nonn of moralityl hinges on 
the fact of creation. As man cannot decide to make something 
without first having a reason for making it, neither can God. In 
creating the universe God first had to have a reason. And since 
nothing else existed before creation, God's reason for creating 
must somehow be contained in Himself. Now since God has nothing 
to gain from creatures--He already possesses everythlng~.Hls rea-
son for creating must be so that He can communicate something or 
Himself to other beings. A man, if he wishes to make ~l instru-
ment to tell tim.e, must select certain materials and place them 
together in a certain order. If the proper order is not ob-
served.. the purpose desired f'rom the combination of the parts 
w111 not be achieved. So too with God. God cannot create, can-
not communicate His excellence to the universe unless the compo-
1 cr. st. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloeiae, I, q. 22, 
a. 2, c.; I-IT; q. 45, a. 2, c; q. 90, a. 1, c. and a. 2, c.J 
q. 91, a. 1, c. 
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nent parts of the universe are so ordered that they reflect and 
thus share 1n Ood's excellence. This order which God places in 
the universe, and which is, to a certain extent, a reflection of 
His own internal order, is called the Eternal Law. To return to 
the watchmaker once more, the purpose of a watch is to tell time. 
Obviously that purpose is not completel! fulfilled by the mere 
completion of the watch. A certa.in amount of time must elapse 
before the watch can tell time. The watch wll1 approach closer 
to its complete perfection as each second passes. ~~e same holds 
true in the world. God does not make (corporeal) creatures in 
their full perfection. They are made in a certain degree of ex-
cellence, but are capable of, and directed to the achievement of, 
a greater perfection ...... throuCh growth and t~be exercise of their 
various faculties and powers. Now in most creatures this advance 
in perfection is automatic; and the part of the Eternal Law gov-
erning their advance is called the Physical Law. nut in the case 
of man, progress in perfection is not altogether automatio. 
Since man has a will which is free, his growth in perfeotion is 
the result of free activity; but this means also that he oan im-
pede his progress. 'Man must figure out for himself what contrib. 
utes to his advancement, and choose accordingly. He must dis-
cover that part of the Eternal Law which pertains to himself, and 
he must govern his actions by it. And this order of things .Moh 
man Jnust observe in his free choices is called the Natural Law. 
If man acts according to the NatlJ.ral Law to the best of his knowl 
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edge he 1s good. If he does not, he is evil. The Natural Law 
is for man the ultimate norm of morality. 
The Natural Law alone, however, is not sufficient a8 a 
norm of morality. Although it is all-comprehensive, governing 
every possible deliberate action a man mi€9:lt perform, it fre-
quently applies only in a general way. Man, by examining his 
own nature and the nature of other creatures, can detert:1ine the 
measure of his actions only in its larger lines. In many eases 
he cannot deduce the necessary specific norms from nature. For 
example, man can know from nature that he has a right to possess 
property, since his own natu.re demands that he support himself 
and his family, and it is the nature of irrational things to con-
tribute to this support by being possessed and used. This prin-
ciple, then, is part of the Natural Law. Wut man cannot know 
from the nature of thines how in particular he may acquire pro-
perty. T'nus t1ere arises a need for a more proximate norm of 
right and wrong, to be determined by legltimate human authority. 
This norm is called Positive Law. It 1s to be noted that Posl-
tive Law is not an independent norm of morality. It has a right 
to existence at all only because it 1s postulated by the Natural 
Law; it l~s 1ts roots in nature. And its decrees are arbItrary 
only to the extent that the Natural Law is indeterminate." It_,. 
in no way oppose the preoepts of the Natural Law. It may only 
oomplete them. 
With these few facts in mind about the Eterna.l Law, the 
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Natural Law, 'nd Positive Law, we are in a position to evaluate 
and make a more critical comparison between the moral doctrine of 
the Sophists and of Sophocles. 
The Sophists wtlO advocated a State-of-Nature morali ty 
all had this one ra1line in common--they did not see any kind of 
relation between nature and God. As a result of this defect, the 
natural law (1f indeed it ca.!'). be called law at all) which they 
proposed as the norm of morality was at best a highly impersonal 
sort of thing. Adherence to such a norm of action was obedience 
not to a supremely intelligent being, but acquiescence to the 
physical forces of the world. To break such a law could not be 
a sin. It was rather a true clv.ap'tlQ.# a "bad shot," a short ad-
vance along the wrong road. To break the law was to make a mis-
take, like making a mistake in arithmetic. Oonstantly to observe 
the precepts of such a law against the pull ot tha passions 'Would 
certainly have called tor stronger convictions than most men are 
capable of. 
But this tailure to see Cod behind nature was not the 
worst error of the Sophists. Had they formed an adequate concept 
of nature, of the hierarchy of belngs and the hierarchy of facul .... 
ties within beines, espeCially, perhaps they would have been led 
eventually to see the divine seal stamped upon tho law of nature. 
But their ideas about nature were {nost inadequate, a..'1.d 1,1ere such 
as to lead them to grotesque and immoral conclusions. 
H1ppias was the least flagrant of the offenders in this 
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r6f:ard. But only because he was the most vague _ Hippias fixed a 
determined eye upon the idea that if men got back to "nature" 
everybody would be happy, because in "nature" everybody was equal 
Just what Hippias meant by nature is not clear. IUpplas 1 state 
of natura seems to have been a condltion of life in Which every-
one developed all his faculties "to the full, and in which there 
were no positive laws to destroy equality_ f!be falsity of thls 
position is eVident. It fails on two heads. First of all, it is 
quite evident that all men are not equal by nature, t:lat mon are 
possessed of highly diversified and in many eases very unequal 
talents. ThIs fact is so plain that one wonders at the wishful 
thinking that could lead men of Hlppias t stamp to assert the con-
trary. Secondly, it was seen above (p.7l) that the positive law, 
whioh Hippias oonoeives of as the great obstacle to man's happi-
noss, is rather an essential condition postulated by nature it-
self for that happiness. Positive law, far from being opposed to 
nature, is rather its natural oomplement. 
Antiphon, too, failed to face the facts which nature 
presented 'to him. Even era.l1ting hi,. assumption that man will at-
tain happiness simply by avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure, to 
seek for a condit1on of lIfe in v;hlch all pain can be avoided and 
pleasure ever enjoyed is to seek for the impossible. EVen a cur-
sory examination of nature reveals that there are certain plea ... 
suros which necessarily involve pain: intellectual pleasures, for 
example, involve a oertain QY'lount of physical pain, and this even 
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where one is ('ree to determine the cond1 tiona of life as he will. 
The question then arises: which pleasures are to be preferred and 
which. pains accepted? This in tUI'n gives rise to a second ques-
tion: which faculties must one exercise a.nd upon what objects to 
gain the most pleasure? And the answer to these two questions 
would have led Antiphon away fI'Oln his hedonl.stic morality to a 
hierarchical concept of natu.re and to a more orthodox natural 
law.2. At all eV6Ilts, w:l th everyone seekine pleasure and avoiding 
pain, as Antiphon would have had it, the consequent lack of or-
der in society would have meant a minimum of pleasure and a max ... 
imum of pain for the general run of men. ~le order insured by 
the observance of the Natural Law is an essential condition tor 
the well-being of society, and Antiphon's hedonistic morality 
could not but have destroyed this oI'der. 
Callicles and Critlas accepted Antiphon's errors and. 
carried them to their logical if perverse conclusion. Taking the 
ultimate criterion of action as pleasure (and Callicies and Cr1-
tiae, as did Antiphon, understood by this the pleasure of the mo-
ment, not the beatitude' of the orthodox Natural-Law doctrine), 
they saw Immediately that this end lUiS impossible of attainment 
2 ct. Aristotle's remarkable observations on this sub-
ject: Nlcomac'Marl Lthlcs, 1176 b - 1179 a; especia.lly the Sttm-
mary statement: "wllat Is proper to each by nature is best and 
most pleasant for each. And for man it Is life according to rea-
son, since it is just this that l~ ohletly is. This lite then 
is the happiest." 
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for all men. An all-out pursuit of pleasure by sor.1e was bound 
to mean paln for others. ',rhe solutlon they offered for this dlf· 
ficulty was a erass one. Refusing to reexamine their premises, 
they pushed on relentlessly to say that it was only for the 
strong to enjoy pleasure; the weak they committed to a life of 
pain. The norm of action for all men was the will of men who 
·were stronger. Theirs was the power, eo theirs was the privilege 
of enjoying life. It remained for the rest of mankind to do the 
arbitrary blddlng of the strong. 
Slnce these two Sophists, Call1c1cs and Critlas, em-
braced the errors of Antiphon, their theory falls by the same 
criticism that applied to Antlphon's. It is impossible that the 
pleasure of.' the moment be the criterion of mants actions. But 
they surpassed Antiphon in error, and thus laid themselves open 
to a more devastating criticism. They asserted that it was not 
for all men to be happy. Happiness was only for the tew, and 
necessarily involved the unhappiness of the r:tany. This state-
ment is contradicted by the facts of nature. J\11 men are equal ... 
ly endowed with the capacity and desire to be happy. Therefore 
it is arbitrary to say that some should attain this end and oth-
ers not. The assumption of course is that it is impossible for 
all men to attain happiness. but this prem.1se is laid down by 
the proponents of the Will-or-the-Stronger doctrine only because 
they fail to see 1n what true happiness consists. Uature itself 
tells us that man can attain true happiness only by perfecting 
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his higher capaoities, his intellect and will, even if it is at 
the expense or the lower faculties. Man will be happy only if 
he pursues knowledge of the truth and love of the good; and WMl'8 
this is done, the natural order of thinGs will be maintained, 
which t~arantees happiness for eve~Jone. It 1s only when the few 
pursue a disordered happlnesS t a false perfecting of the facul-
ties, that the whole of society becomes disordered and the unhap-
piness of the m&1y is increased (though never, in the true view 
or things, destroyed). The exercise or unlirnlted power by a ty-
rant, for instance, although it allows him to perfect certain of 
his faculties and thus brings him. a certain ar'lount of pleasure I 
does not bring him true happiness, since he is either ignorant of 
the truth, or knowing it fails to choose what 1s good, and thus 
frustrates the perfection of his highest faculties, his intellect 
and will. 
The legal positivism of Protagol'&s misses the mark of 
truth by an even wider margin than does the Statf\-ot'-nature the-
ory. Protagoras waL a sensist, and admitted only sonse knowledge 
to be true, 1.e. a knowledge of particulars. Dut since nature 
is a general concept which 1s abstracted from particulars and 
known only through the intellect, not only dId Protagoras fail to 
reach an adequate concept of nature, as did thB Naturalists; he 
failed to reach any concept of it whatsoever. Thus did the veil 
of senslsm hide from his eyes the vision of order in the universe 
whioh is so essential to the formation of a true doctrine on the 
~orm of morality. Protagoras sought refuge instead in positive 
puman law as the measure of actIon. But it has already been seen 
thAt positive law is rooted in nature and is valid only in so far 
as it is in alignment with nature. Protagoras1 attempt to estab-
lish the norm. of morality in this domain, therefore, could not but 
nave tailed miserably. He was trylne the impossible; he andea-
~ored to establish a conclusion, the validlty of positive law as 
~he norm of morality, whose only possible premise, nature, he had 
~lready destroyed. 
How then does the doctrine of the Sophists compare 
with the true doctrine on the norm of morality? \1hat does their 
doctrine make of the three ereat facts of the orthodox explana-
tion: Nature, God .. and Posftlve Law? One school denies nature 
altogether and the other three fail to perceive the order and hi-
~rarehy of values in nature which constitute the Natural Law. 
~one ot the four Sophistic schools sees the relation of nature to 
God, its author and consequently the promulgator of' its law. And 
finally, all or them divorce positive law fram nature, thus com-
pletely destroying the validity of human law. 
It has been shown that Sophocles vigorously opposed the 
SophistiC doctrines on the norm of morality_ ,ljut how does his 
own doctrine comp~e with theirs when evaluated by the same cri-
terion used to Judge the Sophistic morality? 
Before proceeding with this question, it must be re-
marked again that Sophocles does not treat the norm of' morality 
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in the abstract. He was not writing a philosophical treatise. 
Rather he wrote as an artist, in the concrete a..."1.d particular. He 
did not present for refutation the mora.l principles of the Soph-
ists in their abstract fomulation. He gave us rather the logical 
living out of those principles In the individual lives of men who 
embraced them. And the manner of his refutation was the same. 
He did not oppose the Sophistic errors with his own doctrIne in 
the abstract, but rather presented it as lived out in concrete 
action. Sophocles· method has a great deal to recommend it. Ab-
stract principles have little significance for the average man. 
Certain of the Sophists' principles might sound innocent enough 
in the abatract. But when carried out in the concrete action of 
a domineering Creon or a selfish Jocasta, they have a force which 
few can miss. The same holds true for the doctrine Sophocles pro-
posed as an antidote to Sophistic perversity. 
But the artistic method also has its disadvantages. It 
is more difficult for the analyst to reach a precise, certain, 
a.."1d inte~~ral knowledge of the general truths Which are embodied 
in tho concrete circumsta.nces ot." character and action. This Is 
especially true in the case of Sophocles, wl~re not only the con-
cretions of abstract principles, but even expressly general 
truths are presented in a poetical medium. The poetical expres-
sion clarifies the beauty and force of these truths, but It tends 
to obscure their intellectual content. 
These facts are important. One who expects a certain 
r 
'" 
type of evidence in support of a theory and does not rind it is 
apt to conclude, perhaps falsely, that there is no evidence at 
all. 
The three elements of the true norm of moral-lty used as 
a touchstone to evaluate the Sophistic doctrlnes are God, Nature, 
and hQ~ Positive Law. The same elements will now form the ba-
sis for evaluating Sophocles t doctrine. 
The u1t1mate norm of morality is dlvine law. This law 
is eternal and immutable, as 1ts author, God, 1s eternal and im-
mutable. How does the doctrine of Sophocles compare on this 
polnt with the orthodox morality? Sophocles says 1n the Oedipus 
Tzrannu9 that the laws to be observed by all men are the v&~o, 
u,lnoOt~ ••• ~v -OAU~XO~ xa~~ ~ovo~, "laws of range sublime, 
whose father 1s Olympus alone."3 Antigone says that no mortal 
can override these aypa.n1:G. e,~v VO~l~U. "unwritten statutes of 
heaven_"4 They are therefore the ultimate norm of morallty. 
Are these laws then. eternal and immutable? Sophocles 
calls the divine laws u.l~oO&~, and Jebb interprets this as mean-
ing laws "having their sphere and range 1n the world ot eternal 
truths. n5 Furthermore, Sophocles represents Antigone as saying 
of the dIvine laws: ou yap 1:& vCv ye x'xee~, «AA' 4,{ ~o~e 'n 
3 OedlEus Ilrannus, 865-868. 
4 Antiso~eJ 454-455-
5 Jebb,The ~dlpus Tyrannus, n. on line 865. 
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't'a.G't'Cl, "POl' their lire 1s not of to-day or yesterday, but from 
all tlme."6 That the same laws are immutable can be infe~ed 
from the word 'O~ClA~ which Antigone uses to describe them,7 and 
which means, according to Jebb, that the laws "stand fast for-
ever. lt8 
As to the divine element of the norm of morality, then, 
Sophocles' doctrine is perfectly sound. Uut what is to be saId 
of the relation of Sophocles' norm of morality with regard to the 
second element of our criterion, nature? 
According to the orthodox view of the ultimate norm ot 
morality, the Eternal Law of God is promulgated in nature through 
creation. TIlua promulgated it conslstn 1n the interrelat"lon of 
creatures resulting from their ordination to a final end, God. 
This relation or creatures one to another and to God, so far as 
it afrects man, is called the Natural Law. Man can attain a 
natural knowledge of the Eternal Law only from the IDlowledge he 
has of the nature ot creatures and the relationships which fol-
low upon their make-up. It can be ascertained, for example, from 
the nature of plants and animals and from the nature of man, that 
plants and animals are ordained for the use of man in this life, 
sinee plants and animals have no 11te after death, whereas man's 
6 ~ntieone, 456-457. 
7 ~., 454. 
8 Jebb,!h! Antieone, n. on line 454£. 
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soul is immortal. It can be established by an examination of 
nature that a truthful God exists and t~lat r:lan must believe and 
obey Him in all things, since man is God's czaeature and is or-
dezaed to God as to his last end. This is an important truth in 
laying the basis for the acceptance ot direct :revelation from God. 
What can be said of the doctrine of Sophocles c"oncern-
ing the Natural Law? Since Sophocles was evidently ignorant of 
the fact of creation, it was implJ~sible for him. to reach an en-
tirely orthodox view of the Natural Law. But 1s it to be main-
oJ 
tained that ~ophocles fat led altogether to see a norm of morality 
in the natural order of thin~s? 
It was remarked in the last chapter that Sophocles had 
what amounted to a passion for harmony, moral harmony as well as 
physical.. And it was no doubt this love ot harmony which led him 
to see a unity in nature, a natural ordering of things tlowing 
trom a single principle. This principle was for Sophocles not 
the ta.ct of creation but a truth closely related to creation. the 
presence of divine Providence. Sophocles saw, especially wl~n he 
reflected upon human suftering, that there was a divine plan in 
the world which directed all things toward an end, so that an 
evil of a lower order, physical pain, for example, was ordered to 
a food of a higher order, the perfection of character, happiness 
atter death, etc. Such being the case, the divine precepts would 
alWays be in accord with nature (hence Just), since they proceed 
trom divine Providence~ 1be Eternal Law of Sopbocles is in et. 
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feet the Natural Law of the OI'thodox view, because the precepts 
of both are identical: the precepts of both laws flow from the 
notion of finality in the universe. 
But did Sophocles in fact always consideI' the pre-
oepts of the Eternal Law to be just, I.e. to be in accoI'd with 
nature? It would seem from a f~ag~ent at the lost play Thl8stes 
that he did not. The fragment is concerned with a divine command 
probably delivered through an oracle to Thyestea& 
00.&' lap o60el' UA~V av iv ~,~~ 6eo,. 
&AA' I" 6eod' 0' op'wv~a, XRV etw otx~' 
xwpeTv X&Aedn, xeTg' oOo,~oplrv xpe~v· 
atoxpov yap ouoav ~v u~~06y~a, 6eol. 
For no one is wiae except him whom God 
holds in honor. But it looking to the 
gods you al"8 bidden even to proceed 
apart from justice, you must turn your 
steps in that direction; for nothi~g 
is sha!~tul which the gods enjoln.~ 
The principle is here laid down tr18.t nothing w!lich the gods com-
mand 1s wrong; this principle is in accord with Sophoclos' doc-
trine that the ultimate norm of morality is the divine Eternal 
Law. But a difficulty arises out ot the phrase, "even it you are 
commanded to proceed apart rrom justice. u This sentiment would 
lead one to be11eve that a divine oommand could be unjust, i.e. 
contrary to what is right by nature, contrary to the Natural 
Law. And if thls wa.s Sophocles' opin1on, it is obvious that he 
9 A.C. Pearson, lh! Frasmen~s £! 30~hoc1e" Cambridge, 
1917, Vol. I, trag. 247. 
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was in serious error concernin.e; the norm. of morality. Not only 
would such a doctrine place a contradiction 1n God, since He is 
the author of both laws, but 'it would undermino, as far as roan 
is concerned, the valid! ty of tho dIvine law, s l..'"1ce the validity 
of this law depends upon the validity of the Natural Law which 
tells man that God is to be obeyed in HIs commands. 
$uch an interpretation of the fragment, however, is so 
contrary to tile Ceneral spirl t of Sophocles' dramas that one must 
hold it suspect. There Is for example a key phrase in the .Q!9.l-
pus, Tyrannus whose obvious interpretation would seem to identify 
reverence and service to the gods with observance of the dictates 
of justice. Because of its significance with regard to this 1m-
portant question in the moral doctrine of Sophocles, the passage 
deserves to be quoted in tull: 
ct Oe 1" u~ipo~~a ~tPQlv ~ X&y~ xopeue~a" 
A{X4l d~o~~~o', oUOt 
Oa,~ovwv fO~ oe~wv, 
xaxd vav lXo,~o ~Orp4, 
Ouax6~~ou X&p,v Xx&oa" 
et ~~ ~O xepOo' xcpOaveT O,xa{w' 
xal ~wv 'o,~~wv Ip~t~al, 
~ ~wv &e(x~wv at~e~a, ~a~i~wv. 
~l, I~, ~~' ev ~OrGo' 4v~p Stwv ~£X~ 
cG~t~a, *uXa, &~UVtIV; 
, 1 \ , , , 
8' yap ua ~o,alOe .pa(ea' ~,~,al. 
'r ' ~l Os ~e XOpSUElV; 
But :tt any man walks haughtily in deed or 
word, with no fear of justice, no rever-
ence for the images of gods, mayan evil 
doom seize him for rus ill-starred pride, 
it he will not win his vantage fairly, 
nor keep him from unholy deeds, but must 
lay profaning hands on sanctities. Where 
such things are, what mortal shall boast 
any m.ore that he can ward the arrows of 
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'" the ~ods from his life? Nay, if such deeds 
are in honour, wherefore should we join in 
the sacred dance?lO 
It is noteworthy that in this choral ode Sophocles does not makc 
pride (u~~pon~4, XA&Oa,) consist exclusively in irreverence 
toward the gods, as he doubtless would have if' the divine law had 
no relation to what is rieht and wrong by nature~ liatl1er, the 
proud man is one who, first of all, scorns justice, i.e. one who 
pursues his own advantage with injustice (presumably to other 
men), who co.1J'lmits "unholy" deeds, who touches things which are 
not to be touched. It 1s because he COIl"J'l'dts such deeds which are 
unjust in themselves, which are wrong by nature, that the arrows 
of the gods are directed against the proud man. Indeed, it is 
implied here that not even the gods themselves can sanction such 
(essentially) unjust acts (bid a man proceed apart from justice), 
for the chorus concludes its observations with the remark: -It 
such deeds are honorable, why should I danee," i.e. why pay rev-
erence to the gods? 
Perhaps an even m.ore explicit indication that the gods 
could not, to Sophocles' way of thinking, command a man to pro-
ceed apart from. justice is the following statement enunciated by 
Qadipus in the OediEus Coloneus. After cursing both his sons for 
the dishonor they had shown him, Oedipus appeals for the fulfill-
ment of his curse to the fact that .~ 'J(4A4l '4"'O~ l1{xTj tuveOpo~ 
--------
10 qedi£us llrannus, 883-896. 
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ZT}"&~ 4pxa.lo;~ ,,&~o,~, "Justice, revealed from ot old, sits with 
Zeus in the mig,ht of the eternal laws."ll Justice is enthroned 
with Zeus, is all-powerful with Zeus, by reason ot the eternal 
laws. It is over the "eternal laws of natural duty"12 that jus-
tice here presides, and slnce the literal meaning contained in 
the figurative ~u"eOpo~ would seem to be that Zeus is one with 
justice, it is difficult to see how he could bid a man perform an 
aot which is naturally unjust. 
How, then, expla.in the rragment from the Thyestes, 
which states that man should obey God evan if He enjoins some-
thing (in this case incest) that is unjust? Several explanations 
ot the passage are possible which would absolve Sophocles from 
inconsistency and error in his dootrine on the norm ot morality. 
Perhaps the most probable, certainly the simplest, of these ex-
planations is that Sophocles did not subscribe to the view ex-
pressed in the fragment. Since the context of the passage is un-
certain, to say the least. there is no evidence to show that the 
sentiment expressed 18 Sophocles' own, and not merely an utter-
ance ot one ot the characters or the chorus to which Sophocles 
himself lends no support. l ) On the other hand. the context of 
11 Oed12ua Coloneus, 1381-1382. 
12 Jebb, l!l!. ,Qe,dl£us Coloneua, n. on 11ne 1}80. 
13 It is to be noted that Sophocles did not originate 
the Thyestea story, but was treating a myth as handed down to 
him, a tact which further absolves him trom its details. 
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the plays quo"'ted above shows that Sophocles did support the orth-
odox doctrine on justice and the gods. The probability ot this 
explanation 1s fortified by a statement ot Lactantius that in the 
story of Thyestes the oracle did not command incest outright, but 
merely observed trmt for Thyestes "aliter malorum remedium 1E!!-
a!£! ~ E08se, n!!! ~ PeloRia til~a ~oncUbUisset.n~ 
But even it Sophocles subscribed to the prinCiple con-
tained in the fragment, it is not cloar that the principle is op-
posed to orthodox morality, though this seems to be the case at 
first sight. The clause of the fragment that causes the difti-
culty is xav I(~ 6{x~~ xwpefv XIA&Un, "even if you are bidden to 
proceed apart from Justice~" Cannot this expression be inter-
preted w1thout strain to the sense ot the worda, "what is ord1-
-
nar111 contrary to justice?" It must not be forgotten that Soph-
ocles, as a dramatist, 1s not held responsible for the precision 
of language that is expected of a philosopher. He is peml tted 
to omit the distinctions which in everyday language are rather 
understood than expressed; for to include them would weaken the 
rhetorical torce of his drama. And even we, who have the bene-
fits of a fully elaborated science of moralIty, would tend to say 
in ordinary speech, "Homicide is wrong; but if God commands 1t, 
His command should be obeyed." Acts prohibited by the Natural , 
LaW are prohibited qnly 12 A2 !!! as they are opposed to the com-
~ Pearson, ~aSffient8. 186. 
9.3 
Mon good, or opposed to the order of justice or virtue by which 
the common good 1s mainta.ined. It can happen, then, that an act 
IIfhich 1s ordinarily wrong because it ordinarily hinders the com .. 
non good may become legitimate under certain circumstances, be-
cause under those circumatances it promotes the common good (e.g. 
nomicide if commanded by God, as in the ease of Abr~ and 
Iaaac).l4a Now if Sophocles conceived of incest as falling into 
~his category of acts which can under certain conditions become 
~egitimate.~b he was certainly correct in bidding man obey, for 
~he aot would not then be contrary to nature. It Is to be noted 
lin this regard that ;;)ophocles does not say that the gods can com~ 
~and anything they wl11 and by thls fact it becomes not shameful, 
~ut ftther, "Nothing is shameful which the gods command," which 
can mean: the [';ods do not command something shan'letul, for the ve'l11 
reason that it 1! shameful. Sophocles .wld be the la at one to 
say that the gods could make r1eht something which Is cotl.trary to 
the order and harmony of the world, since he set so much store by 
~ivine Providence. Rather he 1s saying just the opposite. He 
says: obey the gods in 1fl1atever they command, because they cannot 
command anything inordinate. Perhaps 1 t 1s not always evident 
how the commands of the Bods are in aooord with the order of the 
14& Summa Theolo81a~, I-II, q. 100, a. 8, c. and ~ ). 
140 God, in tact, could not command incest between par-
ent and child, although He could comma~d it between children or 
the same parents (~., II-II, 154, a. 9, ad l. 
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world, but thai!' is only because man does not see thincs as clear-
ly and comprehensively as the gods-.. The Sophists (and r;ur1pldes 
with them.) would say that 1f man thinks something 113 wrong he 
-
should avoid it, even it the gods do command it. Sophocles says, 
and more correctly, if the gods command something it cannot be 
wrong, and therefore they are to be obeyed. 
The th1rd crlte~ion tor evaluating the Sophists' and 
Sophocles. nor.m ot morality is that ot Positive Law. It w111 be 
recalled that orthodox morality calls tor the existence of human 
positive law as a complement to the Natural Law. Positive law 
must not contradict the Natural Law since it is subordinate to ~h 
Natural Law. 'rhe state-ot-Nature Sophists, beeause ot their mis-
conception of nature, denied the validity of any law whatsoever, 
and hence of positive law in p~ticular. The positivistic Soph-
ists, on the other hand, constituted positive human law as the ul 
timate norm of morality a.nd gave it unlimited scope. 
Sophocles, in combating these two ex-rors, successfully 
meets the requirements of orthodox morality. Although Sophocles t 
chief' effort in opposing the state ... ot .... Nature theorists was to 
show the validity of divine law, there are not wanting passages 
which t~stiry to his convictions on the validIty of human laws as 
well, but only such human laws as do not violate the Eternal LaIr, 
which do not go beyond the bounds ot justice. 
In the ode trom the Ant16o~e on human accomplishments, 
Sophocles commends man when he honors both the laws of the land 
.. 
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(vo~ou~ yep4{pWV xeOVo~) ~ the justice he has sworn by the gods 
to uphold {8ewv ~' &VOPXOV O{xav).l$ ~tntigone tells Creon that 
she did not think his decrees were of such force that they could 
override the unwritten laws of the Gods. 16 The implicatlon here 
is that Creon l s decree concerning the burial of Polyneices would 
have had force had it not been ,in opposition to the decree of a 
higher law. AgaIn, Creon 1s called the new ruler of the land 
VI~p~rOl eewv ,.: auy~ux{a,~, "by the new fortunes that the gods 
have given. n17 The phrase indicates divine sanction ot human 
eovernment. But Creon's power Is not absolute and unlimited, 
despite his own delusions on the point. The city 1s not for the 
ruler, but the ruler tor the city. The ruler must govern for the 
good of the governed: 
". '0." J. ,f\ 0' ". e'~ KP~N: a;A~ yuq " ,~ol XP'IJ~£ ~~o ,~p~e,~ X ~v,o j AI~N: .OA'~ yap aux £oe 'f~'~ ayOpo~ loe tyo. 
KP.: o~ ~o~ xp'a~oOv~o' n ~OA'~ vo~lt,~a'J 
AI.: XUAW' ip~~~~ y' iv o~ r~' !pxo,' ~ovo'. 
Creon: Am I to rule thIs land by other judgment 
than my own? 
Haemon: That is no city which belongs to one man. 
Cr.: Is not the city held to be the ruler's' 
Hae.: Thou wouldst make a good monarch at a desert.18 
And indeed, the whole plot of the Ant1e;one illustrates the truth 
that human law, while generally valid, loses its validity when 
" . 
15 &!ti5one(l 368. 
16 Ibid., 453-455. 
17 Ibid. , 
-
156-157. 
18 Ibid., 7.36-738. 
-
opposed to the higher law whence it derives its original foree. 
It is indeed remarkable that Sophocles, in his opposi-
tion to the errors of the Sophists on God, Nature, and Positive 
Law, approached so closely to the truth. If his doctrine did not 
coincide exactly with the orthodox morality on the norm of con-
duct, it is only because he was ignorant of the fact ot creation. 
Even this lacuna in Sophocles' view of the norm did not a.ffect 
the conclusions of his doctrine so much as it limited the ade-
quacy of the premises for those conclusions, especially the ex-
planation of divine Providence. 
It is not lIkely that Sophocles reasoned scientifically 
to the wondertul truths which he championed in his plays. Such 
reasoning was to come later, consol1dating and elaborating what 
had already been brought to llght even in those ancient pagan 
times. Sophocles. approach was different. The method he used, 
while not so aure as the philosophical, on the other hand has a 
grea ter popular appeal. His method is the poet IS. It is rather 
intuitive than discursive; and to the ordinary man, to whom long 
and close reasoning comes hard, Sophocles. method is impressive. 
It 1s an appeal to common sense, and an appeal to one's love of 
the beauti.ful.. Sophocles wins adherence to the truth by por-
traying the in.'1erent ugliness in the errors of' the rationalistic 
Sophists, and by unveiling with compelling clarity the harmoni-
ous splendor of a world governed wisely and justly by God. 
A great deal of this moral beauty and force in Sopho-
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clea Is independent ot history. It is felt and appreeiated even 
by those who do not know who Sophocles was or when h.e lived or 
with whom. But the .full import of the greatest truths 1n Sopho-
clean drama is not realized until it is understood that the man 
who wrote these dramas was conducting a noble c1'Usade. He was 
waging a war on behalf of truth against errors ot the most per-
nicious sort. For modem readers the interest Ingendered by this 
militant character of Sophocles' plays is heightened by the fact 
that the very errors he .fought to overcome are rampant again in 
our own society: 1n religion, education, and politics. They 
have had a reb1rth and a regrowth in modern times. What was once 
Sophocles' great concern in ancient Greece is now the concern ot 
every man who loves the truth as did Sophocles. ~le relevance 
of his art has not died with the centuries. 
It 1s both .for 1ts own merits and 1ts renew.d signifi-
cance in relation to its modern counterpart that the writer has 
thought it eminently worth-while to attempt in the present thesis 
• presentation of that ancient crusade" 
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